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ABSTSACT OF AN M.A. SUBMISSION 
"FINANCIAL FLCWg WITHIN AND 
BETWEEN SELECTED ARAB STATES" 
PRESENTED BY A.M. UNDERWOOD FOR 
AN M.A. DEGREE SEPTEMBER, 1974. 
As a result of o i l revenues accruitig to certain Arab States 
over the last decade, i t has become apparent that a l l capital 
needs to meet development plans can be met from internal sources. 
A number of inter-Arab development i n s t i t u t i o n s have been 
established i n the region since 1960. Ihese include the Kuwait 
Fund For Arab Economic Development, The Arab Fund For Economic 
and Social Development and the Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee 
Corporation. The Kuwait Fund has been i n operation f o r twelve 
years and has successfully disbursed funds and technical assistance 
to a number of poorer Arab States. The Arab Fund and the 
Guarantee Corporation only recently begun operations. 
The commercial banking sectors of the major Arab o i l states 
have grown rapidly over recent years. Despite this growth the 
banks have s t i l l to play a major role i n the process of regional 
economic development* Advances to v i t a l growth sectors such as 
iiKlustry, agriculture and censnuni cat ions have been small. Banks 
have preferred to finance trade, mostly imported consumer goods, 
and to invest outside the Arab area. 
I I 
A number of specialised financial i n s t i t u t i o n s such as 
ag r i c u l t u r a l and Industirlal banks operate i n the region. These 
i n s t i t u t i o n s have as a primary function the provision of meditnn 
and long term capital f o r particular sectors. To date they have 
not made a decisive impact on economic development within the 
region. A c t i v i t i e s of the specialised i n s t i t u t i o n s have been too 
re s t r i c t e d by f i n a n c i a l ^ practical,and p o l i t i c a l barriers. 
The existence of a certain amount of capital does not i t s e l f 
ensure economic development. A vehicle f o r mobilising and 
d i s t r i b u t i n g capital i n accordance with real growth objectives must 
necessarily be established. Despite rapid growth of financial 
i n s t i t u t i o n s w i t h i n the Arab region, the fi n a n c i a l superstructure 
remains Inadequate to meet these objectives. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Arab region i s made up of a few countries which have a 
strong capital balance and numerous countries which have a capital 
shortage. Over the period 1960 to 1970 certain o i l r i c h states 
namely Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have developed immense capital sur-
pluses amounting to more than |3.2 b i l l i o n . Certain non-oil 
countries, however, namely Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria have 
had to supplement t h e i r resources by capital inflows amounting to 
more than $3 m i l l i o n . ^ Moreover, projections over the next decade 
estimate that the surplus countries w i l l generate more than 
|70 b i l l i o n i n capital surpluses. Although this projection i s 
based on somewhat questionable assumptions concerning G.N.P. and 
price levels, i t does serve as a general indicator highlighting the 
degree of capital unbalance that can be expected to develop i n the 
region over the next ten years. 
Despite the fact that an overall regional surplus exists, only 
part of the capital inflow to the d e f i c i t countries originates i n 
the surplus countries. In some cases Arab capital i s invested 
l o c a l l y through foreign f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and thus giving the 
benefits of interest d i f f e r e n t i a l s to those i n s t i t u t i o n s rather than 
to Arab investors themselves. 
1 . United Nations Economic and Social Office i n Beirut. 
2, Abdlatif Y. Al-Hamad,Arab Capital and International Finance. 
(Kuwait Fund For Arab Economic Development Nov. 1973, P.6). 
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Why i s i t advantageous to both surplus and d e f i c i t countries 
to promote the flow of funds both between and w i t h i n Arab States? 
For the non-oil states i t means a shariig out of regional pros-
perity and subsequent iinprovements i n l i v i n g standards. In as 
much as regional d i s p a r i t i e s constitute an obstacle to s t a b i l i t y 
and peace i n the region i t benefits a l l states to foster mutual 
development. For o i l - r i c h countries the advantages of increasing 
regional economic and social t i e s are perhaps less obvious. 
Growth i n the o i l states has to date been t i e d to a depleting 
source of wealth, crude o i l . I t i s of benefit to the o i l states 
to u t i l i s e this dwindling source of capital to ensure that t h e i r 
economies can sustain themselves when the o i l runs out. F i r s t l y , 
capital can be used to achieve greater factoral balance by develop-
ing the lagging factors of land, labour and management. This i s 
slowly beiflg achieved i n Kuwait throtgh the importipg of labour and 
throtigh education programmes. I n fact, a ceiling on migrants notf 
operates i n that country. Moreover, to encourage ind u s t r i a l and 
a g r i c u l t u r a l expansion, markets of sttfflclent size must be found. 
Local doiasstlc markets I n the o i l r i c h states thanselves w i l l not 
allow goods to be produced on an economically large enough scale. 
The price of Western goods would be lower at almost a l l possible 
levels of output. However, i f l i v i n g standards and therefore the 
demand for goods and services were to r i s e i n the region as a whole, 
Arab markets capable of supporting Industrial and agx^Lcultural 
expansion may be fouixd. 
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Here one can see a l i n k between the o i l states l e n d i i ^ funds 
for the development of non-oil states and t h e i r own future 
development. By encouraging development of poorer states they 
may capture export markets. This would allow these countries to 
d i v e r s i f y and secure a more balanced economic structure not so 
dependent on o i l revenues. 
Flows of capital between and within states may take one of a 
number of forms. They may be i n the f o m of private transfers, 
di r e c t private investments or o f f i c i a l grants and loans. This 
study i s primarily concerned wi t h flows of capital originating from 
f i n a n c i a l development i n s t i t u t i o n s , conmercial banks and specialised 
banks. En^hasis i s placed on the role that financial i n s t i t u t i o n s 
are playing, and may play i n the future, i n the process of economic 
development of the countries concerned and within the region as a 
whole. 
Four countries of the region, namely Saudi Arabia, Libya, 
Kuwait and Lebanon are considered i n th i s study. There are two 
main reasons for t h i s choice of countries. 
1 . They are f i n a n c i a l l y the most important i n the 
Arab world. 
2. The a v a i l a b i l i t y of data l i m i t s the choice of 
countries to these major ones. 
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Chapter I Is devoted to an examination of the Kuwait Fund 
For Arab Economic Development, I n Chapter I I other inter-Arab 
developnent schemes are discussed. In Chapter I I I the commercial 
banking sectors of the above mentioned Arab states are examined. 
This is followed by a comparative study of these banking sectors 
i n Chapter IV. In Chapter V some specialised i n s t i t u t i o n s i n the 
four countries are examined. 
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A. FUNCTIONS AND CAPITAL 
The Kuwait Fund For Arab Economic Development (K.F.A.E.D.) 
was founded i n 1961. Although technically a government agency, 
i n the words of the Director General, L a t i f a l Hamad, i t has been 
granted complete independence not only i n i t s ' finances and 
organisational set up, but also and more importantly i n forming 
i t s ' policies and the conduct of i t s ' relationship with borrowers. 
The question of how f a r i s the K.F.A.E.D. really free from 
p o l i t i c a l considerations i s discussed i n sub-section C. 
The objective of the Fund i s to contribute to the economic 
development of the region through the extension of loans f o r i n f r a -
s t r u c t u r a l projects such as power, transport and I r r i g a t i o n , d i r e c t l y 
productive undertakings i n industry, as well as technical assistance 
operations. The statutory capital of the Fund i s K.D. 200 m i l l i o n , 
but f o r a number of reasons i t s ' growth to this level has been 
fr u s t r a t e d . F i r s t l y , the K.F.A.E.D. i s not the only i n s t i t u t i o n 
channelling fuols out of the area. The General Authority for the 
South and Arabian Gulf disburses of an annual budget of K.D. 2 
m i l l i o n . Secondly, the authorities have been d i r e c t l y granting 
around K.D. 60 m i l l i o n per annum to other states since the 1967 war. 
On top of the capital paid i n by the authorities the K.F.A.E.D. 
can raise funds by borrowing or issuing bonds up to the value of 
twice i t s ' paid i n c a p i t a l , plus reserves. Since reserves are 
intended to be twenty per cent of capital I.e. K.D. 200 m i l l i o n . 
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t h i s would give i t a legal l i m i t of K.D. 680 m i l l i o n . However, 
t h i s source which may eventually enable the Fund to channel huge 
resources from domestic and foreign markets towards the economic 
development of the Arab World has remained to date r e l a t i v e l y 
untapped. One interprets domestic markets to mean Arab money 
markets and foreign markets to mean predominantly European and 
American money markets. The Director General of the Fund deferris 
t h i s policy on the grounds that during the past decade the Fund 
has s t i l l been learning and consolidating. While gaining 
experience and establishing sound relationships with i t s c l i e n t 
countries and with other international agencies, i t has given 
p r i o r i t y to caution, prudence and su f f i c i e n t preparation. I t i s 
also txnje that r a i s l r g funds by the issue of bonds would not be 
economical. For interest paid to bond holders would, i f they are 
to be competitive I n the market, be higher than Interest received 
on Fund loans. 
Despite these l i m i t a t i o n s , the Fund has been able to grow at 
a reasonably regular pace. I t s t o t a l assets rose from nearly 
K.D. 80 m i l l i o n i n 1966 to 1967 to well over K.D. 100 m i l l i o n i n 
1971 to 1972. Table 1 shows the balance sheet of the Fund i n the 
above two periods. 
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BALANCE SHEET OF K.F.A.E.D. AS OF MARCH. 1967 AND 1972. 
TABLE 1 
L i a b i l i t i e s 1967 1972 Assets 1967 1972 
Statutory Capital 
K.D. 200,000,000 
Paid i n Capital 
K.D. 68,000,000 
General Reserve 
K.D. 11,194,003 
Cash I n Hand and i n Banks 
200,000,000 
78,250,000 
29,168,695 
144,116 2,792,399 
Bank Deposits & Securities 
46,779,484 45,060,960 
Loans 
K.D. 79,194,003 107,418,695 
56,550,000 94,068,523 
Capital Paid i n to A.F.E.S.D. 
Accrued Interest 
2,324,102 
Sundry Debtors 
12,327 
6,000,000 
1,617,287 
13,106 
105,810,029 149,552,275 
•Less* 
Loans Undisbursed 
25,805,739 
Loans Repayments 
744,800 
Sundry Credit Balances 
65,487 
27,572,156 
14,301,215 
260,209 
K.D. 26,616,026 42,133,580 
K.D. 79,194,003 107,418,695 
SOURCE; Aimual report of The Kuwait Fund For Arab Economic 
Development,1967 and 1972. 
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LIABILITIES 
Over the period March, 1967 to 1972 authorised capital 
remained at K.D. 200 m i l l i o n while paid i n capital rose from 
K.D. 68 m i l l i o n to K.D. 78.2 m i l l i o n . The f i r s t K.D. 100 
m i l l i o n i s to be provided out of government savings i . e . reserves, 
while the additional hundred w i l l be covered by means of annual 
budgetary appropriations. This modest rate of Increase i n paid 
up capital i s largely explained by p o l i t i c a l factors; these are 
discussed i n sub-section C. 
General reserves consist of funds transfered from yearly 
operating income of the Fund i . e . interest from investments and 
loans minus expenditures. Reserves are classified as l i a b i l i t i e s , 
because by-statute reserves must be twenty per cent of authorised 
c a p i t a l . Furthermore as the Fund i s a state owned I n s t i t u t i o n , 
and p r o f i t s of the Fund should accrue to the Government, reserves 
as defined above represent Government deposits and thus l i a b i l i t i e s . 
General reserves over the period rose from K.D. I I m i l l i o n to 
K.D. 29 m i l l i o n . Although the Fund can make loans from i t s 
reserves i t has to date kept i t s actual disbursements below the level 
of paid i n c a p i t a l . I n 1967 disbursements were less than 50 per 
cent of paid i n c a p i t a l , by 1972 they reached 90 per cent of paid 
i n c a p i t a l . The Fund has not yet made use of i t s power to borrow, 
or issue bonds. 
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ASSETS 
The Funds' f i n a n c i a l operations include loan disbursements 
and Investment of unutilised furais. 
The Funds' l i q u i d assets consist i n the f i r s t instance of 
cash on hand and on the banks, and secondly bank deposits and 
sec u r i t i e s . Information concerning t t e nature and location of 
the Funds' Investment p o r t f o l i o i s not ready available. However, 
i t is known that the Fund holdings are spread over a number of 
currencies, countries and i n s t i t u t i o n s . These funds, i n seeking 
low r i s k and high returns, are most l i k e l y to be found outside the 
Arab region. Ofer the period the t o t a l value of assets held i n 
the above form have not altered s i g n i f i c a n t l y . High Income 
earnings of the Fund over the years, as shown by the increase i n 
reseirve holdings, suggests that changes i n the p o r t f o l i o mix may 
have taken place i . e . a greater proportion of foreign assets are 
held i n securities than i n deposits and longer maturity holdings. 
Total loan committments have risen from K.D. 56.5 m i l l i o n i n 
1967 to K.D. 94 m i l l i o n i n 1972. In 1967, 55 per cent of t o t a l 
loan committments had been disbursed, by 1972 this figure had risen 
to 71 per cent. I t i s i n this category of assets that the Fund 
has registered i t s greatest increase i n a c t i v i t y - as would be 
expected of an i n s t i t u t i o n primarily concerned with making develop-
ment loans. Loan repayments reached K.D. 744,800 i n 1967; by 
March 1972 t o t a l loan repayments had reached K.D. 14 m i l l i o n . This 
not only r e f l e c t s an increase i n loan a c t i v i t y but the end of grace 
periods on e a r l i e r loans. 
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not only reflects an increase i n loan a c t i v i t y but the end of 
grace periods on e a r l i e r loans. 
Capital participating In A.F.E.S.D. refers to capital paid 
to the Arab Fund For Economic and Social Development of which 
Kuwait i s a member.^ 
I t i s significant that the Fund receives approxlnately 60 
per cent of i t s income from i t s investments and only 36 to 30 per 
cent of i t s income from loans. This does Indicate that interest 
rates on loans are of a very low and non commercial nature. In 
real terms losses are l i k e l y to be incurred at such low rates. 
I . See Chapter I I , P. 32> to 38, 
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B. LENDING POLICY AND TERMS OF LOANS 
The Director General of the Fund has outlined the lending 
policy of the K.F.A.E.D. under four principles. 
1. The principle and p o l i t i c a l and social n e u t r a l i t y . 
This shall be discussed i n the next sub-section. 
2. The Fund does not seek to effect the p r i o r i t y of projects, 
but does, however, require projects t o be i n t r i n s i c a l l y 
sound, and show si g n i f i c a n t Impact on the economic;' 
development of the recipient country. One Interprets 
i n t r i n s i c a l l y sound to mean that the project was capable 
of paying o f f the loan and becoming self supporting. 
The Fund does anticipate that the projects i t supports 
w i l l be p r o f i t making. However, most of the projects 
i t supports are of a nature which makes calculations of 
earning capacity over a period of time d i f f i c u l t i . e . 
transport, agriculture, power. 
3. To show f l e x i b i l i t y i n i t s ' lending policy. That i s the 
Fund w i l l make loans to Governments, public e n t i t i e s and 
on some occasions to semi-private enterprises. I n 
practice, however, there are a number of reasons why i t s ' 
loans have mostly been for projects i n the public sector. 
F i r s t l y , the majority of Arab States now have at least 
partly socialised economies, especially i n the f i e l d i n 
Industry and u t i l i t i e s , thus the main impetus for 
development comes from governments. Secondly, the kind 
- 13 - _ 
of infrastructure projects - i n transport, e l e c t r i c 
power and i r r i g a t i o n - that the Fund has so far 
mainly financed, are by t h e i r nature nearly a l l under 
public ownership control* 
4* The Fund w i l l act as a development bank i n i t s approach 
to loans. The Fund w i l l ensure that not only the 
fin a n c i a l soundness of a project is assured, but that 
the project has a direct development impact as measured 
by contribution to national income, the improvement of 
the foreign exchange si t u a t i o n , on the increase i n 
employment, and other factors of similar significance* 
In practice i t is the recipient countries which have 
determined which of the above c r i t e r i a actually carries 
more weight; for most of the K.F.A.E.D, loans have f i t t e d 
into the recipients national developn^nt plan* Loans 
have mostly been for capital intensive schemes and so 
the d i r e c t en^loyment impact is evidently given less weighting 
than t t e d i r e c t impact on foreign exchange earnings or 
the impact on national income. One can Identify two loans 
made by the Fund i n which the impact on en^jloyment was the 
most important consideration. The f i r s t was f o r an 
i r r i g a t i o n project i n Central Morocco where the increase 
of jobs i n a depressed area was a stronger argument i n 
favour of aid than any other* Secondly, the effec t on 
employment rates was considered of prime importance when 
a loan was given for an i r r i g a t i o n project i n Sudan, 
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The schenffi was aimed at re- s e t t l i n g 50,000 people who 
were displaced from the Egyptian border by the 
building of the Aswan High Dam. 
The di r e c t impact on G.D.P. was given strong weightirg i n 
many of the loans granted by the Fund. For example i n Tunisia 
and Sudan, where a h l ^ proportion of people are engaged i n 
agricul t u r e , loans f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l schemes were expected to have 
a strong impact on income levels. 
The direct impact of loans on the foreign exchange position 
of countries was also given strong weighting. This was certainly 
the case when the Fund granted a loan to Egypt for the Suez Canal 
project and a loan to Jordan f o r a t o u r i s t project. 
I t is of course somewhat a r t i f i c i a l to isolate the impact of 
projects on employment, G.D.P. and foreign exchange levels. I n 
fa c t , a project w i l l d i r e c t l y and i n d i r e c t l y effect a l l three to 
varying degrees. Two targets may even be incompatible e.g. 
ca p i t a l intensive projects and lowering unemployment rates. 
I t is a characteristic of the Fund that i t s loans are a l l for 
specific projects and not for general aid to development programmes, 
for f i l l i i ^ gaps i n budgets, or for balance of payments d e f i c i t s . 
The Director General of the Fund believes that planning and 
evolution of future needs i n the Arab economies i s s t i l l too vague 
and embryonic for 'programme aid' to be f u l l y effective.^ 
1, A b d l a t i f , Y.A., B i l a t e r a l Development Aid. The View of 
the Fund (Kuwait Fund For Arab Economic Development, 
November, 1971). 
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However, i t is perhaps true that by the f i n a n c i i ^ of large visual 
projects, the Fund and the state acquire a certain amount of 
prestige. 
Loans are normally given to meet foreign exchange costs of 
projects, but i n certain cases local currency costs are also 
covered i n part. The Funds loans are always made for productive 
rather than social welfare projects such as education, health and 
housing. This more di r e c t and orthodox approach to aid is a 
result of the Funds* belie f that i t i s eventually on productive 
projects that a h i ^ e r level of social welfare expenditure w i l l 
depend. Moreover, the Fund i s aware that other agencies are active 
i n the social welfare f i e l d including the Kuwait Governments' aid 
agency for the Gulf and South Arabia* 
The terms of loans made by the Fund are determined i n the l i g h t 
of each individual project and the overall economic situation of the 
country concerned. Interest rates normally follow a simple pattern, 
3 per cent for a g r i c u l t u r a l loans and 4 per cent f o r other i n f r a -
s t r u c t u r a l or i n d u s t r i a l projects. These above mentioned rates, of 
course, represent very low non-commercial rates. 
As there i s l i t t l e gain for the Fund on economic grounds at 
such low rates, i t i s perhaps evident that the Fund is consciously 
aware of the advantages to Kuwait of fostering mutual development i n 
the region.^ 
1.' See introduction, P.l to 2 
- 16 -
The weighted average maturity of loans has been to date 
about 23 years i n agriculture, 15 years i n transport, 15 i n 
power, and 13 years i n industry, the overall average being 17 
years. Grace periods for payments have varied from four and a 
half years i n agriculture to two and a half years i n industry. 
Al Hamad, The Director General, estimates that the "aid component" 
measured as the grant element i n Fund loans due to reduced 
in t e r e s t rates, varies from 25 per cent to 88 per cent. I t 
averages 50 per cent for loans for agriculture, 35 per cent for 
transport and 30 per cent f o r i n d u s t r i a l and power projects.^ 
There are certain statutory l i m i t s on the amounts the Fund 
can lend. The Fund cannot lend more than 10 per cent of i t s ' 
authorised capital for any one project. This means K.D. 20 
m i l l i o n f o r any one project at t h i s present time. 
The Funds' standard loan agreement calls for certain assurances 
and guarantees from the receiving country. The borrower has to 
provide necessary information, allow inspection of the project by 
the Fund s t a f f , and guarantee the Funds' assets and income from 
nationalisation. There is a clause concernit^ the e f f i c i e n t 
administration of the project. The borrower promises that the 
project management shall have powers necessary f o r the d i l l i g e n t and 
e f f i c i e n t carrying out and operation of the project and undertakes 
to consult with the Fund on any management charges. Another clause 
i n Fund loan agreements provides that no other extemtial debt shall 
1. Robert Stephens, The Arabs' New Frontier. (Temple Smith 
September, 1973, P.62). 
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have p r i o r i t y over a Fund loan. This i s an important s t i p u l a t i o n 
given that many of the recipient countries such as Egypt and 
Syria are l i k e l y to already be heavily i n debt. Problems, how-
ever, may arise out of t h i s s t i p u l a t i o n where other i n s t i t u t i o n s 
with similar safeguards are operating i n the same countries or 
where the Fund plans to j o i n t l y finance a project. 
The Fund, i n i t s ' a c t i v i t i e s , has been aware of the necessity 
to provide not only f i n a n c i a l assistance to the Arab World but 
also technical assistance* The Fund appreciates that i n order to 
encourage a more optimal use of capital and to raise absorptive 
capacity of the Arab States, one must foster the use of greater 
expertise and also the development of expertise at a local level. 
Assistance may range between merely helping i n the preparation of 
a project and on the other extreme supporting some connected 
a c t i v i t y on which the degree of success of the enterprise depends. 
The s t a f f of the Fund, w i t h i n t h e i r c a p a b i l i t i e s , are available for 
consultation. A number of pre-investment studies have also 
received financial assistance from the Fund. The K.F.A.E.D. i s 
also i n the process of setting up advance research and t r a i n i n g 
schemes. The K.F.A.E.D. plans to set up a Law and Development 
Centre to t r a i n Arab Lawyers i n the rudiments of international law 
and an Arab Economic Integration Research I n s t i t u t e to co-ordinate 
Arab economic po l i c i e s . 
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C. POLITICAL STATUS 
The Kuwait Fund, as mentioned i n the f i r s t sub-section, has 
been granted a great deal of p o l i t i c a l independence. However, 
for several reasons the Fund could not be regarded as a completely 
independent body. F i r s t l y , the Minister of Finance is the 
Chairman of i t s ' governing board. Secondly, the government 
provides a l l i t s ' c a p i t a l . One example of a p o l i t i c a l factor i n 
operation came to the forefront following the 1967 war. After 
the 1967 war, the BCuwait government gave d i r e c t aid to those 
countries involved, and as a result the Funds' allocations of 
capital have stayed below what they might otherwise have been. 
In i t s ' lending policy, however, the Fund has succeeded i n 
avoiditg two main kinds of p o l i t i c a l pressure. 
1. The allocations or reduction of aid according to 
p o l i t i c a l p r i o r i t i e s or idealogical preferences. 
2. Tied aid, the l i n k i n g of aid to the supply of goods 
from the donor country. 
This degree of autonomy has been gained by a number of test 
cases. The f i r s t was i n 1963 when the Kuwait government was i n a 
hurry to lend money to the newly independent Algeria. The Fund, 
however, was reluctant to commit funds on any grounds other than 
social or economic. The c o n f l i c t resulted i n a compromise whereby 
£10 m i l l i o n loan was agreed i n principle but the exact projects 
to be financed were to be decided over time by the Fund. 
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More recently, a f t e r the c i v i l war i n Jordan i n 1970 to 1971 
i n t ^ i c h King Husseins army crushed the Palestinian g u e r i l l a 
forces, the Kuwait government suspended the subsidy i t had been 
paying to Jordan since the 1967 Khartoum agreement. The Kuwait 
Fund, despite t h i s , continued i t s ' operations i n Jordan and was 
helping the Jordan government to work out a new project which 
might be financed j o i n t l y by the Fund and the World Bank. 
Furthermore many of the Arab States have republican regimes 
and at least partly s o c i a l i s t economies, idealogically different 
from those of Kiuwait; t h i s has not barred them from Fund aid. 
For example the Fund has granted loans f o r projects i n Syria and 
Iraq, where the Baathist regimes were f o r a l o i ^ time c r i t i c a l 
of the rulers of the Arabian o i l states. The Fund was also 
approached by the revolutionary s o c i a l i s t regime of the South Yemen 
for help when i t was i n desperate f i n a n c i a l s t r a i t s after achieving 
independence. An agreement was signed with South Yemen on the 
very day that the Kuwait regime was beirg denounced as being one 
of the "imperalist stooges" i n demonstrations i n the streets of 
Aden. 
Here the Fund could perhaps be accused of b u y i i ^ friends. 
However, given the small amount of funds that flow through the 
K.F.A.E.D. as compared to o f f i c i a l p o l i t i c a l loans, this seems un-
l i k e l y . Furthermore the reputation that the Fund has developed 
int e r n a t i o n a l l y as an independent body, gives a certain amount of 
prestige to Kuwait and the politicians themselves. 
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Thus while the capital made available to the Fund is subject 
to p o l i t i c a l winds, i t seems that i n the disbursion of paid i n 
capital the Fund does receive a level of autonomy, which would 
compare favourably with other multi-national aid agencies such 
as the World Bank. 
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D. THE KUWAIT FUND AM) ITS' ACTUAL ACTIVITIES 
The a p o l i t i c a l nature of the K.F.A.E.D. has allowed i t to 
give loans to a wide range of countries. Table 2 shows the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of loans by country up to March, 1972. 
TABLE 2 
Country Amount (K.D. Millions) 
Number of 
Projects 
Algeria 10.0 2 
Bahrain 2.0 3 
Egypt 13.3 2 
Iraq 6.8 2 
Jordan 10.2 7 
Lebanon 2.8 2 
Morocco 10.9 3 
North Yemen 1.0 2 
South Yemen 0.3 1 
Sudan 14.9 4 
Syria 7.0 1 
Tunisia 14.5 5 
SOURCE: Annual Report of Kuwait Fund For 
Economic Development, 1972. 
Arab 
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Looking at the d i s t r i b u t i o n of loans by country, i t is 
noticable that Sudan, Tunisia, and Egypt have received considerable 
higher sums than other countries. Sudan i t s e l f received over 
the period K.D. 14.9 m i l l i o n while South Yemen received a 
comparatively small amount of aid K.D. 0.3 m i l l i o n . In general 
these large differences, other than any p o l i t i c a l factors, arise 
because some states have a h i ^ e r absorptive capacity for capital 
than others. The Fund does not believe i n penalisixig those 
countries which are better able to absorb available funds. More 
s p e c i f i c a l l y , countries l i k e Tunisia, Egypt and Sudan have par t i c -
ular characteristics which have enabled them to secure a high 
proportion of K.F.A.E.D. aid. A l l three countries have a strong 
administrative background which i n the case of Tunisia dates back 
to French influence and i n the case of Sudan and Egypt dates back 
to the period of U.K. involvement. This is a big advantage i n 
preparing and presentii^ proposals to the Fund and i n ensuring 
proper use of loans. The Director General has i d e n t i f i e d the low 
standard of loan applications as a serious problem to the Funds' 
operation. 
The Sudan, moreover, has extensive land and water resources 
i n i t s ' Northern region which have naturally attracted c a p i t a l . 
I n f r a s t r u c t u r a l loans were also needed to l i n k together the 
countries widely dispersed regions with the ports and main towns. 
Egypt, while not so well endowed with natural resources, has to 
some extent been able to a t t r a c t foreign aid as a result of i t s ' 
p o l i t i c a l status i n the area. 
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Given Bahrain is an o i l producing state, i t is perhaps 
d i f f i c u l t to understand why i t has been granted aid. This can 
be explained by a number of factors. F i r s t l y , Bahrains' o i l 
production and revenues have never been on the spectacular scale, 
of those of the other Arabian o i l producers. Secondly, Bahrain 
was the f i r s t beneficiary of the Gulf o i l boom, and the f i r s t to 
realise the need f o r d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n i.e. the move away from the 
dependency on o i l . I t has undertaken major in d u s t r i a l ventures 
which have required the importation of foreign capital e.g. 
£62 m i l l i o n aluminium smelting plant. 
Below is a diagram showing K.F.A.E.D, loans distributed by 
sector up u n t i l March, 1973. 
Agriculture 
28% 
Industry 
13% 
SOURCE; Annual report of Kuwait Fund For Arab Economic Development, 
1972. 
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From the sector chart above one can see the concentration 
of aid that has gone for i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l development. Aid has 
been, i n this section, mostly for power, transport and storage, 
which together account for nearly 60 per cent of t o t a l K.F.A.E.D, 
committments. The emphasis is caused by a number of factors. 
F i r s t l y , public u t i l i t y requirements of capital are substantial 
and have to be obtained at r e l a t i v e l y low cost and easy terms. 
Also, power and transport are recurrent bottlenecks i n most Arab 
economies. Among Arab states which lack major o i l and natural 
gas resources, expandii^ hydro-electric power becomes a pre-
requisite f o r i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n and development. 
Agriculture has taken up about 28 per certt of K.F.A.E.D. 
loans as shown above* This proportion shows the appreciation the 
Fund has of the importance of t h i s sector i n developing countries* 
A g r i c u l t u r a l development is important i n areas of over population 
and shortage of foods. I n some areas, Sudan for example, regions 
are r i p e f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l development, but a shortage of capital 
e x i s t s . Also the a g r i c u l t u r a l sector i n most of these states 
accounts f o r a high percentage of the working population and for a 
high proportion of exports and foreign exchange savings. 
The funds going to industry, 13 per cent of the t o t a l , are 
small i n quantity and perhaps inadequate. However, the Fund deals 
mostly i n loans and not i n equity c a p i t a l . Furthermore the Fund 
has tended to leave the financing of smaller i n d u s t r i a l projects 
to other sources. 
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By a closer examination of the Funds' a c t i v i t i e s over the 
last two years one may gain some idea of the types of loans, the 
conditions of loans, and the amount of technical assistance a l l 
advanced duriig these years. Tables 3 and 4 show new loans 
advanced by the Fund over the periods 1971 to 1972 and 1972 to 
1973. 
Nine project loans were made i n 1971 to 1972 t o t a l l i n g 
K.D. 18.5 m i l l i o n . The largest loan committment was to Syria 
K.D. 7 m i l l i o n , f o r a grain si l o s project. The smallest 
committment K.D. 135,000, went to North Y«nen on i r r i g a t i o n 
projects. Interest rates followed a pattern of 4 per cent f o r 
i n d u s t r i a l projects, 3 per cent f o r agricultural loans and a 
minimal 0,5 per cent f o r pre-investment studies. The period of 
payment and grace was generally higher i n agriculture than i n 
i n d u s t r i a l and extraction industries. This reflects the import-
ance the Fund attaches to the development of the agricultural 
sector. Low interest rates f o r non i n d u s t r i a l sectors are perhaps 
necessary as the returns on projects may he hard to measure and 
accrue i n d i r e c t l y over a long period of time e.g. i r r i g a t i o n 
projects. By March, 1973 t o t a l loans committed by the Fund 
reached K.D. 94.3 m i l l i o n . 
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NEW LOANS 1972 to 1973. 
TABLE 4 
Country Projects 
T 
(K.D.1,000) 
Amount 
Date 
r 
Period and 
Grace 
(Years) 
Interest 
% 
Bahrain Power and Water 
Plant 
7,350 24.7.72, 1 8 - 4 4 
North 
Yemen 
Salif Salt 
Mines (2) 
1,200 14.8.72. 2 8 - 4 2 
North 
Yemen 
Highway 
Project 
284 14.8.72. 49 -10 0,5 
SOURCE; Annual report Kuwait Fund For Arab Economic Development, 
1973, 
Three project loans were made i n 1972 to 1973 t o t a l l i n g 
K.D. 8.8 m i l l i o n . The most s i g n i f i c a n t loan was that of K.D. 7 
m i l l i o n to Bahrain for a power and water plant. As i s immediately 
noticable, the Funds' a c t i v i t i e s during 1972 to 1973 were less than 
half that of the previous year. This does not, however, mean the 
Fund i s being abandoned. I t s ' a c t i v i t i e s i n 1973 to 1974 have 
already exceeded the previous years le v e l . During 1972 to 1973 
the Kuwait assembly were increasingly aware of the depletion of o i l 
reserves and so were adding more to o i l or financial reserves and 
givii^g less to development over t h i s period. Also during t h i s 
period the quality of loan submissions was low and subsequently 
the numbers of new loans was low. By March, 1973 t o t a l loan 
committments by the Fund had reached K.D. 102.9 m i l l i o n . 
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From the above data one can see that loans for pre-investment 
studies and surveys form only a small f r a c t i o n of loans that the 
Fund d i s t r i b u t e s . Over the period 1971 to 1973 less than 
K.D. 1 m i l l i o n was loaned out f o r pre-investment purposes. I n 
view of the c r i t i c i s m the Fund has made about the standard of 
loan applications, i t would seem that more aid could usefully be 
channelled for such purposes as pre-investment studies and surveys. 
Recognising the shortage of technical 'know-how' i n developing 
areas, the Fund has made several grants f o r pre-investment studies. 
This marks an attempt by the Fund to ensure a mave optimal allocation 
of c a p i t a l and to take a more a c t i v i s t part i n i t s ' approach to 
loans. Tables 5 and 6 show the d i s t r i b u t i o n of technical aid 
grants i n 1971 to 1972 and 1972 to 1973. The grants are mostly 
for pre-investment studies. 
The t o t a l amount given i n grants duriiqg the period March, 
1971 to March, 1973 was K.D. 76l,000j K.D. 411,000 was given i n 
1971 to 1972 and K.D. 350,000 i n 1972 to 1973, Several points 
emerge from the above data. F i r s t l y , i n the l i g h t of poor loan 
submissions refeirred to by the Director Gei^ral, t o t a l technical 
grants are small. Secondly, only a few countries have received 
technical grants. Over the two years Sudan, South and North 
Yemens acquired v i r t u a l l y a l l the grant allocations. I t should be 
noted, however, that the technical assistance component is l i k e l y 
to be underestimated across the board as technical aid i s incorpor-
ated as part of many loans. 
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TECHHICAL ASSISTANCE GRANTS 1 9 7 1 to 1 9 7 2 . 
TABLE 5 
Recipient 
—p-' r 
Purpose Amount (K.D.1,000) 
Sudan Technological -
Economic Studies 
for a Sugar Plant 
Project 
100 
Technological -
Economic Studies 
Livestock 
Development 
5 0 
South 
Yemen 
Fish Heal and 
Fish Oil Pre-
investment Study 
5 0 
North 
Yemen 
Salif Rock Salt 
Geological Survey 
8 5 
Resident Technical 
Assistance M.ssion 
7 1 . 4 
Technical Economic 
Study 
Textile Industry 
2 5 
Ideas Technical Economic 
Study - Arab Petro-
chemical Corporation 
3 0 
SOURCE; Annual report of Kuwait Fund For Arab Economic 
Development, 1 9 7 2 . 
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TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE GRANTS 1 9 7 2 to 1 9 7 3 . 
TABLE 6 
Recipient Purpose Amount (K.D. 1 , 0 0 0 ) 
Sudan Transport Study 2 5 0 
South Fish Meal and Oil 5 0 
Yemen Plant 
North Tihama Agiriculture 5 0 
Yemen Project 
SOURCE: Annual report of BCuwait Fund For Arab Economic 
Development, 1 9 7 3 , 
Technical experts, financed by the Fund, normally come from 
outside Kuwait. For example, a Hungarian f i r m carried out the 
survey of the Wadi Zabid project i n the Yemen, a Swedish f i r m was 
brought i n to carry out a pre-investment survey i n Bahrain, How-
ever, experts from the Arab states have also been hired. Two 
studies i n the Yemen were to be carried out by an Arab fir m of 
consulting engiitters. As the Fund has only recently been active 
i n grantiiig assistance f o r pre-investment studies and surveys i t i s 
too early to see i f these studies are followed by project 
implementation. 
Besides pre-investment studies, the Fund has been aware of 
the necessity of encouragii^ the supply of s k i l l and management 
capable of completing and servicing projects. I n this context the 
re p a t r i a t i o n and training of loc a l talent is extremely important. 
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A. THE ARAB FUND FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
(A.F.E.S.DTI 
The A . F . E . S . D . was approved by the Arab Economic Council i n 
1968 and started i t s ' operations i n 1972. I t i s expected that 
the Fund w i l l act as co-operation bank f o r the Arab region. I n 
i t s ' lending policy the Fund w i l l favour the financing of j o i n t 
Arab economic projects. ^ 
The A.F.E.S.D. shall contribute to f i n a n c i % projects f o r 
economic and social development i n the Arab states by: 
1. Financing, f o r investment, easy term loans to government, 
private, and public i n s t i t u t i o n s and bodies, giving 
p r i o r i t y to projects v i t a l to Arab e n t i t i e s and j o i n t 
Arab countries. 
2. Encourage, by direc t and in d i r e c t means, investment of 
private and public funds so as to foster growth and 
development of the Arab World. 
3. Providing technical expertise and assistance i n the 
various aspects of economic development. 
I n i t s ' present form, the A.F.E.S.D. was drafted by the Kuwait 
Fund and put forward by the Kuwait Government during the Khartotim 
Arab Summit meeting i n September, 1967. 
Participation is extended to members of the League of Arab 
States plus any other Arab state that has subscribed to the capital 
1 . Arab Fund For Economic and Social Development, Agreement 
Establishing The Arab Fund For Economic and Social 
Development, (, 1968T 
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of the Fund before July 1st, 1968, Admission can take place 
a f t e r t h i s date i f approved by the board. The Fund has authorised 
c a p i t a l of K.D. 100 m i l l i o n which is completely convertible, 
Subsctiption i s according to the wealth of each country. The 
Board of Governors may approve any increase i n capital paid i n by 
a member or any change i n authorised c a p i t a l . 
Similar to the Kuwait Fund, the A.F.E.S.D, can obtain added 
resources by issifing bonds or obtaining credit from private and 
public i n s t i t u t i o n s , individuals, and international i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
Unless otherwise approved by the board, the Fund can not raise 
funds greater than twice i t s ' c a p i tal plus reserves ( 2 (K + R ) ) . 
The main organ of the Fund is the Board of Governors with two 
representatives from each member country. There is also a Board 
of Directors which i s elected by the Governors and consists of four 
persons. This body i s responsible f o r directing the general 
operations of the Fund and exercises a l l the powers delegated to i t 
by the Governors. There i s also a loans committee whose function 
w i l l be to study project and loan applications. 
I t should be realised that the A.F.E.S.D. i s not simply an 
extension of the Kuwait Fund. Although i t i s , i n being, a develop-
ment bank f o r the Arab countries, necessarily similar i n many ways. 
I t i s anticipated that the A.F.E.S.D. w i l l operate i n a number 
of ways dissimilar from the K.F.A.E.D.^  
1. United Nations Economic and Social Office i n Beirut, 
The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development. 
(ESOB/pp-Conf. l / 7 ^ i 
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1. The Arab Fund by virtue of i t s ' multi-national nature 
w i l l embody a regional ethos i n i t s ' formulation of 
pol i c i e s . I t is hoped that the A.F.E.S.D. w i l l favour 
regional schemes involving more than one country i n a 
project. The Kuwait Fund has primarily been concerned 
with b i l a t e r a l agreements. 
2. I t i s anticipated the new Fund w i l l give aid for social 
development such as health, education arel housing, as 
well as to d i r e c t l y productive economic projects. The 
Kuwait Fund has concentrated on the l a t t e r . ^ The Arab 
Fund w i l l be supportii^ a high proportion of project^ 
whose returns are low and require loans at very low non-
commercial rates. This could represent a considerable 
extentlon to the type of non-commercial financing 
a c t i v i t y that the Kuwait Fund is already involved i n , i n 
the region. 
Given the Arab Funds broad aims, i t is suggested that i t s ' 
2 
specific objectives may be as follows. 
1. Supplement and not supplant financial resources available 
to member countries. 
2. Increase each member countrys' capacity to make e f f i c i e n t 
use of local and external c a p i t a l . 
1. See Chapter I , P. 14 
2. United Nations Economic and Social Office i n Beirut, The Arab 
Fund f o r Economic and Social Development, (ESOB/pp.-Conf.1/72). 
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3 , Promote regional economic co-operation and integration 
and help to reduce disparities i n levels of l i v i n g , 
4 , Assist members to ef f e c t the type of economic, social, 
and technological transformation which would enable 
them to control t h e i r own resources, and to achieve the 
degree of economic independence and power warranted by 
the nHgnitude and nature of these resources. 
Alternative policy approaches that could be used by the Fund 
to achieve i t s objectives d i f f e r according to the degree of 
activism which the Fund is prepared to exercise, A passive approach 
of simply selecting from among loan applications by member countries 
may be c r i t i c i s e d on several grounds, 
1, I n i t i a t i o n of projects by member countries i s mostly 
guided by local and p a r t i c u l a r i s t considerations and 
rarely takes i n t o account multi-national interests, 
2, Application f o r external loans by member countries is 
often a substitute,for a more effective e f f o r t at domestic 
resource mobilisation, 
3 , Economic planning and programming i n most member countries 
i s s t i l l i n i t s ' infancy, and so project i n i t i a t i o n i s not 
l i k e l y to lead to optimal solutions, 
4, The project i n d e n t i f i c a t i o n process i n most member 
countries i s constrained by low levels of development of 
the public administration, and/or private enterpreneurship, 
leading again to poor project selection. 
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I t can be argued then that the Arab Fund, i n order to reach 
or go part of the way i n reaching i t s ' objectives, should adopt 
an active approach. Here i t would take I n i t i a t i v e i n conducting 
the ne cessary research and pre-investment studies Co conceive 
projects of direct impact on the achievements of i t s ' targets, and 
to promote the finances and entrepreneurship, public or private, 
required for t h e i r implementation. 
However, for a number of reasons the Arab Fund may not be able, 
or f e e l i t desirable to persue a highly active approach. F i r s t l y , 
the Funds' a c t i v i t i e s w i l l ultimately be constrained by the statutes 
i t operates under and the capital i t is supplied with. A 
conservative interpretation of the clauses of the agreement may 
preclude some of the a c t i v i t i e s of the Fund. Secondly, a more 
active approach requires a more complex organisation to administer 
i t . Given the shortage of s k i l l e d management i n the region this 
may not be possible. Thirdly, an active approach may be thought 
undesirable as Intervention by the Fund i n the regions development, 
necessarily gives less control to individual governments over t h e i r 
own fut u r e . This may be a potential source of c o n f l i c t . I t i s 
perhaps worth noting that the K.F.A.E.D. has adopted a role less 
active i n nature than i s being advocated f o r the new Arab Fund. 
THE A.F.E.S.D. AND ITS' FIRST YEAR IN OPERATION 
The year 1973 witnessed the beginning of lending operations 
by the Fund. Durlr^ the year three projects were submitted to the 
Board f o r financing and i n February, 1974 they were approved. The 
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loans t o t a l l i n g K.D. 7 , 2 m i l l i o n , relate to projects i n three 
member countries. 
1 , Tunisia received a loan of K.D. 2 m i l l i o n for the 
construction of an e l e c t r i c a l generating plant South 
of Tunisia. Included i n the loan i s the cost of prep-
aration of design and the supervision of construction. 
2 , The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen received a 
loan of K.D. 3 , 2 m i l l i o n f o r a multi-purpose project at 
Mokalla. The project includes the construction of a 
f i s h meal and f i s h o i l processing l i n e , a modern fishing 
f l e e t , a harbour at Khalf and the expansion of the 
ele c t r i c power st a t i o n at Mokalla. Part of the loan i s 
for study and tr a i n i n g missions abroad, 
3 , Syria received a loan of K.D. 2 m i l l i o n for the con-
struction of underground reservoirs f o r o i l projects. 
Based on only one year of operation, i t would be presumptuous 
to coins to any fir m conclusions about the nature of the Funds' 
a c t i v i t i e s . However, a number of significant points emerge aft e r 
only such a short period of time. The Arab Fund has seemingly 
adopted a number of the characteristics associated with the lending 
policy of the K.F.A.E.D.^  
1 , See Chapter I P. 1 2 to 1 4 and P, 3 3 to 3 4 . 
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1. I t has granted loans f o r n a t i o n a l and not j o i n t 
Arab p r o j e c t s . 
2. I t has granted loans f o r d i r e c t l y productive p r o j e c t s 
and not s o c i a l p r o j e c t s . 
There are i n d i c a t i o n s , however, t h a t the Arab Fund w i l l i n 
the f u t u r e move onto a more a c t i v i s t approach and s a t i s f y some 
of i t s ' o b j e c t i v e s . ^ 
1. The Fund has already financed a multi-purpose p r o j e c t . 
2. The Fund has been keenly a c t i v e i n prov i d i n g t e c h n i c a l 
assistance i n both preparing and s e r v i c i n g p r o j e c t s . 
3. The Fund i s a t the moment considerice three j o i n t Arab 
p r o j e c t s which are: 
Pan Arab Shipping Company 
Navigation Aid Ins p e c t i o n Unit 
Highway l i n k between the Y.A.R. and 
the P.D.R.Y. 
1. See P. 34 t o 35. 
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B. THE INTER-ARAB INVESTMENT GUARANTEE CORPORATION 
(I.A.I.G.CTI 
Estimates suggest that there exists, i n the sphere of private 
funds, a potential f o r mobilising local capital i n amounts f a r 
greater than anything yet offered i n the way of o f f i c i a l aid. For 
example during 1 9 6 5 to 1 9 7 0 Kuwait alone saved an average of 5 0 
per cent of her G.N.P. Of t h i s , some 4 0 per cent was Invested or 
spent outside Kuwait, 1 3 per cent of which went to various Arab 
countries i n the form of o f f i c i a l aid. The remaining 27 per cent 
went outside Kuwait i n private and government investments. This 
outflow was estimated at K.D. 8 0 m i l l i o n i n 1 9 6 9 to 1 9 7 0 and 
K.D. 6 0 m i l l i o n 1 9 7 0 to 1 9 7 1 . ^ With the recent rise i n the price 
of o i l one would expect savings and foreign investment to expand i n 
the future. 
Part of these private investments from Kuwait as well as from 
other o i l countries i n the Gulf have gone to other Arab countries. 
Exact figures of private capital flows between the Arab countries 
are not readily available, but i t is generally believed that such 
flows are usually directed towards property development i n the t o u r i s t 
areas such as Jordan and the Lebanon and towards bank deposits I n 
fina n c i a l centres such as Beirut. Private loans and direct invest-
ments are thought to account f o r l i t t l e of the t o t a l flows between 
the Arab countries. 
1 . Stephens, R., The Arabs' New Frontier. (Temple Smith, 1 9 7 3 , 
P . 7 0 ) . 
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The t o t a l might, however, have been f a r greater, but for the 
p o l i t i c a l risks faced by investors i n son» of the countries - risks 
of nationalisation or expropriation or of stringent exchange 
control blockiiig the recovery of p r o f i t s . I f Arab private invest-
ors are to put more of t h e i r money into Arab countries, they w i l l 
need assurances against such risks as mentioned above. 
With t h i s i n mind the Kuwait Fund submitted the I.A.I.G.C. 
scheme to the conference of Arab Industrial Development i n 1966, 
I t has now been signed by fourteen of the Arab League states and 
r a t i f i e d by eleven. 
The basic idea behind the scheme is to create a kind of j o i n t 
arrangement i n which Arab countries, whether capital exporting or 
capital importing, would participate on equal status. The 
corporation was to recognise that from the viewpoint of overall 
development i n the area, the scheme should seek to protect invest-
ments other than j u s t those flowing from r i c h to poor countries. 
Flows of capital may move from rich countries to poorer states or 
i n some cases from poor to r i c h countries. Normally one would not 
think i t desirable to encourage flows of capital out of a poorer 
country, but i n some instances t h i s need not be the case e.g. i f no 
opportunity exists for investment i n a region where pockets of 
surplus capital e x i s t . 
Although the basic idea was to accept and reject applications 
according to the merits of each case, the corporation gives p r i o r i t y 
to three categories of investment. 
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1 . Those which promote Arab economic co-operation, 
2. Those which build up the productive capacity of the 
host countries. 
3. Those for which the w r i t i n g of an insurance i s an 
essential incentive factor i . e . otherwise no invest-
ment would take place. 
Membership i s extended to a l l Arab governments or any public 
organisation w i t h i n a country on behalf of that country. The idea 
behind this alternative is to shelter the corporation from undue 
p o l i t i c a l pressures. However, i t seems doubtful whether this 
option i s going to be taken, or even i f i t was, that the corporation 
would necessarily be of an a p o l i t i c a l nature. 
The capital of the Corporation paid i n by the members, i s to 
K.D, 1 0 m i l l i o n - a sum smaller than was o r i g i n a l l y envisaged. The 
agreement provides for the capital of the Corporation to be open-
ended, that is allowing for an increase i n capital supplied by a 
member and by accession of new members. Originally, paid i n 
capital by each meaber was to be encouraged by the provision that 
each member could have amounts insured i n respect of Investments 
not exceeding twice the share of i t s ' c a pital. This provision has 
since been dropped as a result the a c t i v i t i e s of the corporation may 
be somewhat less than could otherwise have been expected. The 
adoption of the provision, however, may have un f a i r l y benefited 
these states with large capital surpluses i.e. most capable of paying 
i n c a pital to the corporation. 
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There is an extensive l i s t of categories e l i g i b l e under the 
scheme. Four main types can be l i s t e d . 
1. Direct investment - ownership of firms and branches, 
2. Portfolio investment - stocks and bonds, 
3, Loans of greater than three years maturity. 
4, In exceptional cases shorter loans are also e l i g i b l e . 
I n i t i a t o r s of the scheme were reluctant to include short 
terra loans»for the scheme was meant to consider only l o i ^ term 
investments. I t was not i n any way intended that guarantees should 
be offered for short term monetary flows. 
No d i s t i n c t i o n i s made i n the agreement as to who i s lending 
and who is borrowing. Private, mixed, or public property i s 
e l i g i b l e providing the public operate on a commercial basis. This 
provision, however, evokes two c r i t i c i s m s . F i r s t l y , the 
Corporation was primarily intended to protect private investment 
flows, but now flows from government or public e n t i t i e s can seek 
protection for investments. This i n i t s e l f is not necessarily 
undersirable, but the foundit^ principle behind the scheme may be 
undermined i f guarantees to public flows are given at the expense 
of private flows. Secondly, the q u a l i f i c a t i o n that public or mixed 
enterprise investments are e l i g i b l e i f they operate i n a commercial 
way may be unsatisfactory on social grounds. For example, is i t 
better to guarantee an investment loan f o r a commercial concern, 
than to guarantee an investment for a necessary public u t i l i t y ? 
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One can see that by stepping outside the origi n a l boundaries of 
the scheme additional ambiguities and problems arise. 
As the scheme is for the Arab countries, rules about national-
i t y have been formulated. For a single investor he must be a 
c i t i z e n of one of the member countries. I n the case of a corporate 
e n t i t y , i t must be substantially owned by citizens of the contract-
ing parties or by one of those parties. 
Broadly speaking the Corporation guarantees against three 
types of non-commercial r i s k s . 
1. P o l i t i c a l r i s k s , these r e f e r to action by the host 
country which deprives the investor of substantial rights 
over his investments such as expropriation and 
nationalisation. 
2. Transfer r i s k s , these refer to r i s k of non-convertibility 
and non-transferability of income, interest, or 
principle out of the host country. 
3. The Corporation may guarantee losses due to acts of war, 
r i o t s and revolutions. 
Given the Corporations limited resources, only a small percent-
age of possible investment flows between the Arab states could be 
guaranteed against the above. I t i s here that the adoption of an 
Arab investment code becomes an important complementary factor.^ 
1. See P. 46. 
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The i n s t i t u t i o n a l structure of the Corporation is f a i r l y 
simple i n nature. The Council i s the governing body and includes 
a representative from each member. The management of the 
Corporation i s vested i n one person the Director General who i s 
responsible f o r the conduct of operations within the l i m i t s drawn 
by the Councils decision. There i s also a supervisory committee 
made up of these members, one from industry, and the other two 
from the Council. I t s ' function is to check and advise the other 
two organs. 
The Corporation is limited i n i t s ' operations i n several ways. 
F i r s t l y , i t s ' t o t a l w r i t t e n guarantees shall not be greater than 
f i v e times i t s ' c a p i tal plus reserves (5(K + R)), Secondly, no one 
guarantee shall exceed 10 per cent of capital projects, so as to 
avoid over exposure i n any one country. Also compensation paid 
on a policy should not exceed losses or the value covered i n the 
guarantee, which ever is the less. 
The I.A.I.G.G. has only recently begun i t s ' operations and 
so to evaluate i t s ' a c t i v i t i e s at t h i s date would be premature i f 
not impossible. The Corporation w i l l f i r s t be tested when some 
country defaults on repayment of a guaranteed investment. One can 
say, however, that i f the Corporation is successful i n i t s ' object-
ives, local capital w i l l be made more readily for local investments. 
In a regional context t h i s is important i n as much as closer 
p o l i t i c a l and economic t i e s may emerge. The success of the 
Corporation i n mobilising private capital w i l l of course depend 
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u t l i n i a t e l y on r e t u r n s obtainable. C a p i t a l may not be f o r t h -
coming unless returns are s u f f i c i e n t l y high, even w i t h guarantees 
as o u t l i n e d above. There may be other markets o f f e r i n g s i m i l a r 
guarantees and a t the same time o f f e r i n g higher rates of r e t u r n . 
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C. TOWABDS AN INTER-ARAB INVESTMENT CODE 
Complementary t o the I.A.I.G.C. the Kuwait Fund has supported 
a move towards the adoption of a common Arab investment code. A 
pr e l i m i n a r y d r a f t of the Code worked out by the K.F.A.E.D. was 
adopted w i t h only s l i g h t a l t e r a t i o n s by the Council of the Arab 
Economic Union a t Damascus i n August, 1970. 
The Code w i l l apply only t o Arab investments i n Arab count r i e s . 
Arab i n v e s t o r s are considered absolved from the accusations of neo-
c o l o n i a l i s m or e x p l o i t a t i o n l i a b l e t o be l e v e l l e d against other 
f o r e i g n i n v e s t o r s e s p e c i a l l y the more powerful i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i r m s . 
I n the o u t l i n e so f a r agreed the Code recognises the r i g h t of Arab 
c o u n t r i e s to n a t i o n a l i s e p r i v a t e f i r m s p r o v i d i n g such a c t i o n i s i n 
the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t and t h a t the inves t o r gets f a i r and e f f e c t i v e 
compensation - provisos s i m i l a r t o those generally l a i d down i n 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. This f i r s t p r i v i s o i s nebulous i n nature. 
N a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t i s not something e a s i l y d efinable and may i n some 
instances be l i t t l e more than p a r t i c u l a r governmental preju d i c e . 
Furthermore i t i s d i f f i c u l t to ensure t h a t f a i r and e f f e c t i v e 
compensation i s paid, even i f one can overcome the problems of 
a r r i v i i ^ a t such a f i g u r e . The Code also accepts the r i g h t of Arab 
governments to c o n t r o l the co n d i t i o n s of ownership and operations of 
f o r e i g n investments and the emplo3rment of f o r e i g n n a t i o n a l s . 
The Code lays down p r i n c i p l e s of behaviour aimed at safe-
guarding i n v e s t o r s i n t e r e s t s . 
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1. Arab i n v e s t o r s should enjoy adequate s e c u r i t y and 
p r o t e c t i o n w i t h treatment at l e a s t as good as l o c a l 
n a t i o n a l s and no less favourable than other f o r e i g n 
i n v e s t o r s . The d i f f i c u l t i e s of ensuring f a i r 
treatment have been mentioned above. 
2. Investors should have the r i g h t to t r a n s f e r p r o f i t s , 
debts, and compensation out of the country and 
r a p a t r i a t e t h e i r p r i n c i p l e w i t h i n the l i m i t s compatible 
w i t h the economic s i t u a t i o n of the country. 
One of the major determining reasons why an investor may 
choose to enter one f o r e i g n market rather than another i s whether 
he f e e l s he can r e p a t r i a t e f r e e l y h i s earnings on investments from 
one and not the ot h e r . Thus i f investors are to be encouraged 
i n t o f o r e i g n markets i t i s necessary to make i t clear under what 
c o n d i t i o n the r e p a t r i a t i o n of income i s not allowed, i f any. This 
second p r i n c i p l e f a i l s to do t h i s , 'compatible w i t h the economic 
s i t u a t i o n of the country* could be i n t e r p r e t e d t o mean almost any-
t h i n g * The l a t i t u d e given by the wording i n p r i n c i p l e two could 
w e l l extend the r i g h t s of govexmments and not the investor over 
c a p i t a l t r a n s f e r s i . e . j u s t i f y s t r i n g e n t controls on c a p i t a l t r a n s f e r s . 
The adoption of an investment code, by the Arab s t a t e s , based 
on m u l t i l a t e r a l support and r e c o g n i t i o n of the i n t e r e s t s of both 
i n v e s t o r and host country, i s c e r t a i n l y d e s i r a b l e . I n p r a c t i c e 
the existence of such a code could play an important p a r t i n regional 
development by encouraging a grea t e r volume of inter-Arab c a p i t a l 
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f l o w s . However, the adoption of the Code o u t l i n e d above, may 
f o r several reasons already mentioned, f a l l s hort of achieving 
these o b j e c t i v e s . 
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Arab o i l states e s p e c i a l l y Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya 
have over recent years acquired large c a p i t a l surpluses. Arab 
banking has an important r o l e t o play i n channelling t h i s surplus 
f o r the purpose of l o c a l and regional economic development. 
Through the net-work of bank branches, the banking sector 
represents the most e f f e c t i v e mechanism f o r m o b i l i s i n g savings. 
How f a r the commercial banks have developed t o meet t h i s challenge 
i s the subject of t h i s Chapter. The commercial banking systems 
of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya and Lebanon are examined.^ 
A. KUWAIT 
There are f i v e commercial banks operating i n Kuwait. 
1. The Kuwait National Bank. 
2. The Kuwait Commercial Bank. 
3. The Gulf Bank. 
4 . The A h l i Bank of Kuwait. 
5. The Bank of Km^ait and the Middle East. 
A l l of them are p r i v a t e l y owned and must have a 100 per cent 
Kuwaiti shareholding. There are seventy s i x branches now i n 
existence. 
1. See I n t r o d u c t i o n , P.3. 
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As one can see from Table 7 the assets and l i a b i l i t i e s 
p o s i t i o n of the commercial banks has undergone remarkable change 
over the l a s t few years. The combined assets of the banking 
sector increased from K.D. 293 m i l l i o n i n 1965 t o K.D. 790 
m i l l i o n i n 1972. This i s not s u r p r i s i n g i n view of the countries 
r a p i d economic growth, i n which o i l revenues are the main source 
of income. This rapid economic growth has meant an increase i n 
demand f o r f i n a n c i a l assets. 
The t a b l e shows how the r e l a t i v e importance of f o r e i g n assets 
to l o c a l advances has increased over the 1965 to 1972 period. The 
value of f o r e i g n assets increased by 250 per cent over the seven 
years, and t h a t of advances and discounts to l o c a l residents by 230 
per cent. Ihe banking sector i s evid e n t l y f i n d i n g i t more p r o f i t -
able to i n v e s t abroad than a t home. 
Table 8 shows i n more d e t a i l the combined balance sheets of 
the banking sector over the period 1970 t o 1973. 
LIABILITIES 
The bulk of l i a b i l i t i e s accounts have been to loc a l r e s i d e n t s . 
I n 1972 they c o n s t i t u t e d about 73 per cent of t o t a l l i a b i l i t i e s . 
L i a b i l i t i e s to f o r e i g n e r s i n the same year only amounted t o about 
10 per cent of the t o t a l . This small percentage i s a r e f l e c t i o n 
of two f a c t o r s . F i r s t l y , the existence of an ample supply of 
l o c a l funds makes i t unecessary f o r Kuwaiti banks to a t t r a c t 
f o r e i g n deposits. Secondly, the advantages inherent i n the 
Lebanese banking system make i t more a t t r a c t i v e to f o r e i g n deposits 
than iCuwaiti and other Arab banking sectors. 
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TABLE 7 
DEVELOPMENT OF MAIN ASSETS AND 
LIABILITIES OF KUWAITI COMMERCIAL BANKS 
1965 to 1972 ( i n Million K.D.) 
Year Total of 
1 
Advances Deposits 
31st 
March 
Balance 
Sheets 
Foreign 
Assets 
and 
Discounts 
to 
Residents 
Public Private 
1965 293.4 173.3 65 35.8 173.9 
1966 337.1 193.1 78.7 46.7 189.8 
1967 448.3 260.1 94.6 49.9 263.3 
1968 467.1 258.3 102.5 43.9 267.6 
1969 601.3 323.8 133.5 51.1 344.9 
1970 628.7 350.7 128.3 64.6 299.2 
1971 713.7 406.6 135 77.7 327.0 
1972 789.7 434.0 151.1 82.9 378.0 
SOURCE: Third Annual Report of the Central Bank of Kuwait. 
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TABLE 8 
COMBINED BALANCE SHEET OF KUWAIT 
COMMERCIAL BANKS 1970 to 1972. 
Assets 
1970 
(K.D.OOO'S) 
1971 
(K.D.OOO'S) 
t 
1972 
(K.D.000 •s) 
Amount % Amount % 
• - I -
Amount % 
Foreign Assets 350,701 70 406,599 71.1 433,980 79.0 
Advances and 
Discounts to 
Residents 
128,298 25.6 135,012 23.6 
\ 
151,099 24.0 
Other Assets 22,144 4 .4 30,236 5.3 43,507 7.0 
TOTAL: 501,143 100 571,847 100 628,586 100 
LIABILITIES 
Residents 
Deposits 
363,813 72.6 404,661 70.8 460,836 73.3 
Foreign 
Deposits 
59,533 11.6 70,969 12.4 63,790 10.1 
Shareholders 
L i a b i l i t i e s 
28,084 5.6 33,429 5.8 38,077 6 .1 
Other 
L i a b i l i t i e s 
49,713 9.9 62,788 11.0 65,883 10.5 
TOTAL: 501,143 100 571,847 100 628,586 100 
SOURCE: Third Annual Report of the Central Bank of Kuwait, 
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I n 1972 time or d e p o s i t accounts comprised over 50 per cent 
of t o t a l deposits. Saving deposits contributed a l i t t l e less 
than a quarter of the t o t a l i n 1972. Current deposit accounts 
comprised about a f i f t h of the t o t a l i n the same year. Most 
deposits i n Kuwait commercial banks are i n Kuwaiti d i n a r s . I n 
1972 almost 80 per cent of deposits were i n the l o c a l currency. 
Recently, moreover, there has been a considerable s h i f t from 
f o r e i g n to l o c a l currency. Between 1970 and 1972 deposits i n 
K.D. have increased by 10 per cent whereas deposits i n f o r e i g n 
currencies have correspondingly decreased. 
The weakening and subsequent devaluation of the D o l l a r and 
S t e r l i n g over the 1970 to 1972 period in^josed losses on deposits 
dominated i n these currencies. Further asset d e p r e c i a t i o n was 
avoided by movement i n t o other currencies. Subsequently the 
demand f o r deposits has r i s e n and the l o c a l currency has moved i n t o 
a stronger p o s i t i o n v i s - a - v i s other currencies. 
ASSETS 
Foreign assets are the most important i t e m I n the banking 
sectors asset p o r t f o l i o . They compromise more than two t h i r d s o f 
t o t a l assets. This implies two t h i n g s . F i r s t l y , t h a t Kuwaiti 
banks are channelling most of t h e i r resources outside the country. 
Secondly, t h a t the bulk of the income they receive derives from 
overseas. The other major source of income, namely adi^ances and 
discounts t o residents,was earned l o c a l l y . 
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Lendir^ r a t e s vary between s i x and°eight per cent. These 
r a t e s , low i n comparison to Western commercial r a t e s , r e f l e c t i n 
p a r t the excess l i q u i d i t y p o s i t i o n of the banks. However, t h i s 
may not be the only explanation of the i n t e r e s t r a t e l e v e l . The 
a u t h o r i t i e s do s t i p u l a t e t h a t a 7 per cent c e l l i n g on lending 
r a t e s should be adhered t o . 
I n 1972 l o c a l c r e d i t c o n s t i t u t e d only a l i t t l e more than a 
qua r t e r of the t o t a l assets p o r t f o l i o of commercial banks. I n 
the context of f l n a n c i i ^ l o c a l economic development i t would appear 
t h a t the commercial banking sector i s playing only a minor r o l e . 
Table 9 shows the d i s t r i b u t i o n of commercial banks loans by economic 
sector i n 1972. 
TABLE 9 
Sector 
1972 
(K.D,Million) 
31st March 
% 
Trade 105.3 70.4 
In d u s t r y 21.3 14.1 
Construction 23.5 15.5 
TOTAL: 151.1 100 
SOURCE; Third Annual Report of the Central Bank of Kuwait. 
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The t r a d i n g sector, as shown above, received 70 per cent of 
t o t a l l o c a l c r e d i t advanced by the banking sector i n 1972. Trade 
c r e d i t i s advanced mainly f o r the i m p o r t a t i o n and d i s t r i b u t i o n of 
consumer goods e.g. beverages, tobacco, f o o d s t u f f s , radios, 
t e l e v i s i o n s , and washing machines. 
Credit of t h i s k i n d , however, does not d i r e c t l y encourage 
s e l f s u s t a i n i n g growth i n the economy, j u s t growth of imports. 
I n c o n t r a s t , the share of c r e d i t a l l o c a t e d t o more d i r e c t l y 
productive sectors was r e l a t i v e l y small. The i n d u s t r i a l sectors 
share was only 14.1 per cent i n 1972 and the c o n s t r u c t i o n sectors 
was 15.5 per cent i n t h a t same year. 
This p a t t e r n of c r e d i t d i s t r i b u t i o n may be explained by a 
number of f a c t o r s . 
1. There are few investment o p p o r t u n i t i e s i n sectors other 
than t r a d i n g i n Kuwait. Interviews w i t h banking o f f i c i a l s 
i n Kjjwait have confirmed t h i s as a major explanatory 
f a c t o r . 
2. The f a c t t h a t the banks only lend f o r short periods 
and do not'normally provide investment c a p i t a l . 
3. The commercial banks are p r o f i t making i n s t i t u t i o n s and 
do not have as an o b j e c t i v e , a t any cost, the f i n a n c i n g 
of l o c a l or regional development. 
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Data concerning the exact l o c a t i o n of f o r e i g n assets held 
by BCuwait commercial banks i s not a v a i l a b l e , but one can gain 
some idea of the nature of these assets from the data below. 
TABLE 10 
MAIN COMPONENTS OF FOREIGN ASSET HOLDINGS 
OF KUWAITI COMMERCIAL BANKS. 1972. 
Components 
bferch (K.D. M i l l i o n ) 
1972 % 
Foreign notes and 
coins and money at 
c a l l and sho r t 
n o t i c e 
30 7 
Balances w i t h 
f o r e i g n banks 
294 67.7 
C e r t i f i c a t e s of 
deposits 
27 6.3 
Foreign b i l l s , 
bonds and shares 
19 4.5 
Other f o r e i g n 
investments 
11 2.4 
Advances to non-
resi d e n t s 
53 12.1 
TOTAL: 434 100 
SOURCE; Fourth Annual Report of the Central Bank 
of Kuwait. 
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Balances w i t h f o r e i g n banks represents the l a r g e s t p o r t i o n 
of the f o r e i g n assets p o r t f o l i o . I n 1972 t h i s represented 
67.7 per cent of t o t a l f o r e i g n h o l d i t ^ s . Other important items 
are advances to non-residents, money a t s h o r t c a l l and n o t i c e , 
and c e r t i f i c a t e s of deposits. I t would appear t h a t the bulk of 
f o r e i g n holdings are i n l i q u i d form. L i q u i d assets, as defined 
by the Central Bank of Kuwait, are those assets t h a t can be r e -
c a l l e d w i t h i n a one month pe r i o d . More r e c e n t l y and as a r e s u l t 
of u n c e r t a i n t i e s i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l money markets, a movement away 
from s h o r t term l i q u i d assets and towards l o r ^ term assets has 
been e v i d e n t . I n 1972 the b i l l s , bonds,and shares item accounted 
f o r 4.5 per cent of t o t a l f o r e i g n assets. By 1973 t h i s f i g u r e 
was 11.6 per cent. Most f o r e i g n assets of the banking sector 
are believed to be held outside of the Arab region. Substantial 
amounts are held as e u r o - d o l l a r deposits and i n euro-bonds. 
Part of these funds w i l l f low overseas i n d i r e c t l y through the 
Lebanese banking system. 
Although a v a i l a b l e data i s i n many respects inadequate, and 
t h e r e f o r e conclusions somewhat questionable, what evidence i s 
a v a i l a b l e suggests t h a t the Kuwaiti banking sector contributes 
l i t t l e by way of finance towards economic development of the region. 
This i s l a r g e l y explained by reasons o u t l i n e d above. I n 
a d d i t i o n non-economic r i s k s to investment are high. The f e a r of 
e x p r o p r i a t i o n , n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n and exchange c o n t r o l may discourage 
the flow of p r i v a t e c a p i t a l w i t h i n the region. 
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B. SAUDI ARABIA 
There are eleven commercial banks operating i n Saudi Arabia. 
Two are n a t i o n a l banks, three are Arab banks and s i x are f o r e i g n 
owned. Out of a t o t a l of s i x t y branches, t h i r t y e i g h t belong to 
the two n a t i o n a l banks. Over the period 1971 to 1972 the 
n a t i o n a l banks accounted f o r over 80 per cent of t o t a l deposits 
and investments made by a l l commercial banks. 
Table 11 shows the development of some balance sheet com-
ponents of the commercial banks i n Saudi Arabia. 
TABLE 11 
COMBINED BALANCE SHEET OF 
SAUDI ARABIAN COMMERCIAL BANKS (MILLION RIYALS) 
Mid-
Year 
1 1 
Cash i n hand 
a i K l w i t h Sama 
Net f o r e i g n 
Assets 
Loans and 
Advances to 
Private Sector 
Total deposits 
(excluding i n t e r 
bank deposits) 
1966 221 + 2 1,091 1,045 
1967 266 + 27 1,260 1,236 
1968 325 + 113 1,373 1,361 
1969 250 + 167 1,478 1,476 
1970 252 + 323 1,565 1,616 
197|1 348 + 471 1,634 1,881 
SOURCE; Annual Report of The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, 
1971, 
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The amount of cash i n hand and w i t h the Saudi Arabian 
ttonetary Agency (S.A.M.A.) has increased by 57 per cent between 
1966 and 1971. Net f o r e i g n assets have recorded a spectacular 
r i s e over the period concerned. Between 1969 and 1971 they 
nearly t r e b l e d and between 1970 and 1971 they r e g i s t e r e d a r i s e 
of nearly 46 per cent. Loans and advances to the p r i v a t e 
sector have also recorded a considerable r i s e , about 50 per cent 
between 1966 and 1971. According t o S.A.M.A. the reason why 
c r e d i t t o the p r i v a t e sector has not r e g i s t e r e d a greater increase 
was because of excess l i q u i d funds i . e . p r o f i t s and income being 
used f o r investment purposes r a t h e r than loans. Concomitantly a 
s u b s t a n t i a l increase i n f o r e i g n holdiiigs has taken place. The 
a v a i l a b i l i t y of bank c r e d i t i s r e f l e c t e d i n the low r a t e of 
i n t e r e s t imposed on loans, 3 to 4 per cent. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g 
t o note t h a t although the bulk of commercial bank funds are 
u t i l i s e d l o c a l l y the trend appears to be away from l o c a l and t o -
wards f o r e i g n markets. 
Deposits went up by 76 per cent between 1966 and 1971. 
Between 1969 and 1971 the increase recorded exceeded 27 per cent, 
w h i l e i n 1970 to 1971 the f i g u r e was 16 per cent. I n view of the 
magnitude of o i l revenues accruing to Saudi Arabia, i t i s not 
s u r p r i s i n g t h a t the banking sector has witnessed such a large 
increase i n a c t i v i t y . I n 1971 alone, Saudi Arabia received 
§2,146 m i l l i o n i n o i l revenues. The income generated by o i l 
revenues has brought about an increased demand f o r income generating 
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assets such as time and saving deposits. Although returns of 
2 to 3 per cent are low, bank deposits represent a less risky 
and more prof i t a b l e form of investment than some t r a d i t i o n a l 
assets, such as physical assets and money under the bed. The 
fact that banking a c t i v i t y has not grown at an even faster rate 
i n Saudi Arabia r e f l e c t s a number of factors.^ 
The main source of funds f o r Saudi Arabian commercial banks 
i s from within the country. Data g i v i i ^ the share of private 
and public deposits i n t o t a l deposits i s not available. I n 
Saudi Arabia, where public and private wealth are i n many cases 
indistinguishable, perhaps the d i s t i n c t i o n i s a l i t t l e a r t i f i c i a l . 
But i t i s known that i n the period 1968 to 1970 demand deposits 
increased by 18.8 per cent, saving and other deposits by 12.8 per 
2 
cent. The deposits of government and semi-government 
i n s t i t u t i o n s were placed with the two national banks, the National 
Commercial Bank and the Riyal Bank. The National Commercial Bank 
alone accounted f o r about 45 per cent of a l l bank a c t i v i t y 
conducted i n the country i n 1971 to 1972. In the period 1961 to 
1971 the deposits rose by about 15.2 per cent from S.E.L.S. 345 
3 
m i l l i o n to S.R.L.S. 869 m i l l i o n . The Implication here is that 
public deposits have increased substantially over the period 1969 
to 1972. 
As i n many other Arab countries, credit for financitg trade 
accounts for the bulk of loans and advances made by the banking 
1. See Chapter i:V., P. 77. 
2. Annual Report of The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, (1971). 
3. I,B.I.D. 
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sector. The most prof i t a b l e source of income l o c a l l y was derived 
from short term credit extended to finance foreign trade dealings. 
According to Hassan Ahmad, who has made a study of Saudi Arabian 
banking, about 40 per cent of t h e i r funds are used for t h i s 
purpose.^ Construction a c t i v i t i e s account f o r about 35 per cent 
of loans and advances. Less profitable sources were funds used 
for the finance of internal trade and the giving of personal c r e d i t . 
I t would appear that although much of the banking sectors 
cr e d i t i s used lo c a l l y i n Saudi Arabia, because of the nature of 
t h i s c r e d i t , the banking system has yet to play a major role i n 
local development. The i n d u s t r i a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l sectors have 
l i t t l e f i n a n c i a l assistance from the commercial banks. I f the 
banks are to be more active i n putting the Saudi economy on a self 
sustainii>g growth path, a r e - d i s t r i b u t i o n of credit i n favour of 
d i r e c t l y productive sectors i s desirable. 
Detailed data showing the exact nature and location of foreign 
assets held by the commercial banking sector are not available. 
One would expect the foreign assets p o r t f o l i o to resemble that of 
2 
the Kuwaiti comnercial banks. The Saudi banking sector, i t would 
seem, contributes l i t t l e to Arab regional development. The capital 
that flows outside the country i s for the most part finding i t s ' way 
i n t o Europe and U.S.A. and not into the poorer Arab States. 
1. Arab Economist, Banking i n The World, (August, 1973, P.70), 
2. See P. 57. 
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C. LIBYA 
There are f i v e commercial banks operating i n Libya. 
1. The Umma Bank 
2. The Cumhouria Bank 
3. The National Commercial Bank 
4. The Wahdo Bank 
5. The Sahara Bank 
The f i r s t three are public owned while the State has a 51 per 
cent shareholding i n the other two. Where banks are only p a r t i a l l y 
nationalised the remaining shares are a l l owned by Libyans. The 
banking sector i n Libya has been nationalised since 1963 i.e. before 
the revolution. 
Table 12 shows the consolidated balance sheet of commercial 
banks i n Libya over the period 1969 to 1972. 
LIABILITIES 
Nearly a l l the funds of commercial banks i n Libya corns from 
w i t h i n the country. Total deposits account for about 80 per cent 
of l i a b i l i t i e s , demand deposits being over 64 per cent of this 
figure i n 1972, Borrowing from other local banks, foreign 
i n s t i t u t i o n s and from the Central Bank constituted only a small part 
of t o t a l l i a b i l i t i e s . 
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ASSETS 
Table 12 shows that Libyan commercial banks u t i l i s e nearly 
a l l t h e i r funds w i t h i n the country. Some interesting trends 
w i t h i n the assets p o r t f o l i o have taken place over the period 
1969 to 1972, 
The r a t i o of t o t a l deposits to t o t a l assets amounted to 20 
per cent i n 1969, This rose to over 41 per cent i n less than 
three years. In contrast, the r a t i o of the value of loans made 
to t o t a l value of assets exceeded 65 per cent i n 1969, but dropped 
la t e r to less than 50 per cent at the outset of 1972. Thus the 
re l a t i v e importance of loans f e l l i n the period concerned while 
that of deposits with other banks correspondingly has risen. The 
commercial banks of Libya have redistributed t h e i r funds away from 
loans and towards deposit with other banks. A most probable reason 
for the s h i f t was the limited absorptive capacity for credit of the 
Libyan economy. 
Overall the t o t a l assets or l i a b i l i t i e s of the banking sector 
have registered an increase of over 66 per cent between the end of 
December, 1969, and January, 1972. From Table 12 one can see that 
items cash i n hand, demand deposits of the commercial banks, and the 
deposits of with overseas banks have i n money terms doubled during 
the relevant period. Time deposits have recorded a ninefold increase. 
I t i s not surprising, given banking is nationalised i n Libya, 
that the banking sector plays an important role i n financing local 
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TABLE 12 
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET 
OF COMMERCIAL BANKS IN LIBYA 
(M'OOO OF LIBYAN DINARS) 
Assets 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Cash at hand 2,769 4,324 4,300 5,552 
Demand deposits with Central 
Bank 16,136 17,701 66,406 33,819 
Demand deposits with other 
Commercial Banks 884 2,327 328 571 
Time deposits with other 
Commercial Banks 205 1,928 514 514 
Time deposits with Central Bank 5,550 5,020 53,777 49,427 
Deposits with overseas banks 4,113 6,673 7,830 8,514 
Overdrafts, loans, advances, 
discounts 92,932 96,198 107,605 111,016 
Foreign currency assets 270 586 293 447 
Fixed assets 3,709 3,987 3,989 4,018 
Other assets 8,175 21,245 25,843 10,080 
TOTAL 134,743 159,989 270,085 223,958 
LIABILITIES 
Capital and reserves 8,452 9,903 9,913 10,292 
Demand Deposits 69,498 91,170 175,521 143,785 
Time deposits 19,898 23,156 24,636 22,943 
Saving deposits 11,574 15,408 11,931 13,728 
Borrowing from the Central Bank 7,195 1,226 5 -
Borrowii^ from other local banks 9 9 2 -
Borrowing from overseas banks 2,610 1,067 2,060 1,491 
Other L i a b i l i t i e s 15,507 17,968 46,183 31,719 
SOURCE: Bu l l e t i n of Central Bank of Libya, v o l . 12 No. 1, 1972. 
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economic a c t i v i t y . The Central Bank i n Libya can control the 
amount and d i s t r i b u t i o n of credit going to various sectors i n the 
economy. In 1970, loans and advances to local residents accounted 
for 60 per cent oE the t o t a l assets p o r t f o l i o . 
More importantly one must examine the nature of banking sector 
a c t i v i t y . How f a r does the Central Bank exercise i t s ' power of 
d i r e c t i o n and control to promote local economic development? Table 
13 shows the pattern of credit advanced by the banking sector over 
the period 1969 to 1971. 
The development of communication, industry,and agriculture are 
necessary pre-requisits f o r sustained economic growth. Data shows 
that the banking sector has advanced r e l a t i v e l y small amounts of 
credit to these sectors. In 1971 industry received 11 per cent, 
transport 7 per cent, and agriculture only 2 per cent of t o t a l 
banking c r e d i t . In contrast, general commerce received 38 per cent 
of t o t a l banking credit i n 1971. Finance was mainly for the 
importation and d i s t r i b u t i o n of consumer goods not d i r e c t l y promoting 
economic development. 
To conclude, i t appears that quantitatively the banking sector 
i n Libya does play an important role i n financing local a c t i v i t y . 
Nationalisation of the system has ensured, through directives, that 
funds are channelled f o r local purposes and very l i t t l e capital i s 
being exported. Qualitatively the banking sector has been less 
active i n promoting economic a c t i v i t y than might at f i r s t be apparent. 
I t s ' a c t i v i t i e s are mostly t i e d up with financing import trade. 
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TABLE 13 
LIBYAN COMMERCIAL BANK CREDIT 
BY SECTOR 1969 to 1971 (gOO L.D".) 
Sector 1969 1970 1971 % 1971 
General Commerce 39,365 35,539 40,813 37.9 
Construction 15,562 16,690 18,791 17.5 
Transport Services 6,455 8,123 7,091 6.6 
Petroleum 4,158 2,279 2,159 2.0 
Industry 9,118 12,050 12,034 11.2 
Professions and 
Individuals 4,114 4,131 4,646 4.3 
Mortgages on Buildings 5,030 5,385 8,374 7.8 
Agriculture 1,640 1,858 2,123 2.0 
Hotels and Entertain-
• ment 2,053 3,449 1,339 1.2 
Public U t i l i t i e s 1,777 2,584 1,689 1.5 
Other Items 3,533 3,988 8,545 7.9 
TOTAL 92,835 96,196 107,604 100 
SOURCE; Bu l l e t i n of The Central Bank of Libya, 
v o l . 12 No. 1, 1972. 
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D. LEBANON 
Beirut i s well established as a Middle East and international 
f i n a n c i a l centre. At the end of 1972 seventy three banks were 
operating i n Lebanon. Twenty six of these are foreign owned. 
There are seven Arab banlcs and f o r t y Lebanese banks. The expansion 
that has taken place i n the banking sector since 1945 when only nine 
banks operated i s explained by a number of factors. 
Banking law i n Lebanon i s considered favourable to banking 
a c t i v i t y i n a number of aspects. 
1. The exchange of money i s free and not restricted by law. 
Thus the cost and non-economic risks of holding money 
assets are low. 
2. The transfer of capital and p r o f i t s i s unrestricted by 
law. This may have the effect of encouraging the inflow 
of foreign capital and so stimulate the banking sector as 
a^'result of general economic growth. 
3. The banking secrecy law of September, 1956, made i t un-
lawful to reveal the names of deposit holders to anyone 
other than the holders themselves. This acts as a strong 
a t t r a c t i o n to those who, for a number of reasons may wish 
to keep secret asset accounts. Lebanese banking laws are 
similar t o &7iss laws i n this respect. 
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4, I n Lebanon the j o i n t account law exists by where an 
account may be used by anyone of two signatures. 
5. A l l deposits i n Lebanese currency are guaranteed by the 
Banks Deposits Guarantees I n s t i t u t i o n . 
Some other influencing factors can be i d e n t i f i e d . The 
geographical position of Lebanon between two continents has helped 
to make i t a port to the Arab World and the centre of most foreign 
transactions. Also capital inflow from Arab o i l states has 
contributed to the growth of the Lebanese banking system. 
Table 14 shows the consolidated balance sheet of the Lebanese 
banking system over the period 1968 to 1972. 
LIABILITIES 
Deposits account f o r about 70 per cent of commercial bank 
funds. They accounted for 66 per cent of t o t a l l i a b i l i t i e s i n 
1966 and 74 per cent of t o t a l l i a b i l i t i e s i n 1972. For reasons 
already mentioned above, much of these deposits originate from out-
side Lebanon especially from Arab o i l states and the West. The 
Lebanese economy does not so much generate deposits i n t e r n a l l y , but 
rather acts as host to large sums of refugee funds. 
Time or saving deposits are the most important deposit item 
representing 64 per cent of deposits i n 1972. Ttese deposits 
receive 4 per cent i n t e r e s t . Demand deposits have f a l l e n over the 
period as a percentage of t o t a l l i a b i l i t i e s . This figure was 
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23 per cent i n 1968 and 17 per cent i n 1972. The foreign 
l i a b i l i t i e s item has also f a l l e n durirg the 1968 to 1972 period 
from 23 per cent of t o t a l l i a b i l i t i e s i n 1968 to 17 per cent i n 
1972. 
In absolute terms banking a c t i v i t y , as measured by change 
i n deposits, has increased rapidly from L.L. 3,958 m i l l i o n i n 
1968 to L.L. 7,046 m i l l i o n i n 1972. Over t h i s period demand 
deposits have risen at a slower rate than time or savings deposits, 
r e f l e c t i n g the increase i n demand f o r interest bearing assets and 
a f a l l i n demand for purely money assets. 
ASSETS 
Claims on the private sector represents the most important 
item. I n 1968 this item accounted f o r 51 per cent of t o t a l assets 
and i n 1972 the figure was 45 per cent. This re l a t i v e f a l l i s 
most probably a r e f l e c t i o n of the limited local absorptive capacity 
for banking credit on banking terms. The local credit factor was 
off s e t over the period by a steady increase i n credit to the public 
sector. I n 1968 the public sector acquired 1.7 per cent of t o t a l 
banking assets while i n 1972 t h i s figure had risen to 10.0 per cent. 
The foreign assets p o r t f o l i o represents an important item 
w i t h i n the banks t o t a l assets. In 1968 foreign assets accounted 
for 40 per cent of t o t a l assets by 1972 th i s figure had risen to 45 
per cent. Thus there has been a tendency for Lebanese banks to 
increase t h e i r holdings of foreign assets r e l a t i v e to other assets 
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over the period. This implies that foreign holdings have been 
seen, by the banks, as more prof i t a b l e than investments i n the 
local market. 
Table 15 shows banking credit d i s t r i b u t i o n by sector i n the 
economy over the period 1969 to 1971. As i n many other Arab 
countries, the trading sector receives the bulk of finance offered 
l o c a l l y by the commercial banks. Those sectors which need to grow 
i f the country i s to achieve economic growth and independence are 
receiving only negligable shares of cre d i t . In 1971 the trading 
sector received 54 per cent of t o t a l credit while the ind u s t r i a l 
and a g r i c u l t u r a l sectors received only 16 per cent and 3 per cent 
respectively. 
Concluding i t would appear that the Lebanese banking sector 
has yet to play an important role i n the process of economic develop-
ment of the Lebanese economy. I t s ' foreign orientated structure 
may be explained by a number of factors. 
1. The economic l i b e r t y which the banks enjoy provides them 
with the opportunity f o r operating as they do. The 
Lebanese Central Bank never intervenes i n commercial bank-
ing policies, 
2. Although Lebanese banks outnumber the foreign banks they 
remain to some extent weak i n their organisation. The 
strong foreign influence may p a r t i a l l y explain the foreign 
--73 -
i-H 
w i 
o 
z 
o 
u 
w 
H 
O 
CO 
H 
o 
w w 
a o 
<: 
o 
H 
M M 
O 
Q 
H 
PP 
w 
o 
M 
z 
o 
M 
t-l 
n) r—N /-^ u CO 00 cn CO vO r-l vO O O f-l CN rH 00 00 00 o •u . • . . • • • . • . o> vD f-l CO CM CO r-l o 
y-i .-1 i-l f-l UO r-l CM r-l o 
o r-l 
r-l CO /- N /—\ !>. vD f-l CO CM r-l vO t>. o 
o CD vO CM o O CO CO r-l o 4J O * • » . . . . . . • • cn vO r ^ 00 r-l CO 00 m CO o 
i-i f-4 IT) CM CM o O .-H T-H 
o ^ — s — s - t vO O lO vO 00 CO r-l r- r ^ lO \ o CM CM f-l o r-l CM T-l CM CM i - i CM r-l ^—^ 
O^  vO 
r — \ s ^—N 
o >o C31 cn CT> o CO r ^ 00 O O o r-l o o rH 00 m o r-l V—' 
« 
r-l /—\ y—V 
00 CO CO o r-l o CM . . • . . . . «' -. r-l IT) f-l f-l CO CJ5 o CO . 00 n O vD CO o •<t 00 r-l r-l T-l CM uo CM r-l CO vO 
t - l CM 
o ^ — s 00 CM O) CO 00 CO vO o r-l . . m m « . •. CM 
CO 
vO 
CO 
a 
o 
•H 
U 
CM lO CM "<t 00 -"t r-l CO CM CM 
r>» 00 
CO 
1^ O 
vD r^ o 00 CM 
O) CO 
• . . . CM CM CM 
a> CM CM r-l CO CM r-l 
t - l 
a 
o u •H 
3 U 4J }^ u r-l U 3 
3 u U 
O 10 4J 9) •H a (0 •X) 
u T3 c ca 00 C o u 
< H o H 
•<t CT> 00 CM CO vO 
00 vO CO 
cn CO CO o o 00 00 r-l CM 
V 
1^ 
v 
u 4J •rl 
T3 
0) 
o 
H (0 4J 
(1) 
n
a
i 
to
 
to
 
8 s C or
 
e
s
 
e
r s io
i 
C
ri
 
U) 60 •H u U 4J •rl CO to in 0) •H M •rl 3 10 3 to (fl 4J u j j HI v > (0 3 (U •H •H •rl •rl u u C •H •H o 
Q T3 TJ T3 o c o •T3 i J •rl 
<u <U (U <u H CO o <U U VI M M I-I M c U 1 1 1 1 O M > 
CO 
o 
o 
CM 
f-l CM CO vO 
c 
o 
c 
« 
M 
C 
O 
CO 
a 
O CO 
- 74 -
orientated nature of the banking sector. Decisions 
about banking investments w i l l be made by foreign 
headquarters and not by local management, 
3, Given that credit is normally advanced for only short 
periods of time the absorptive capacity of the Lebanese 
economy f o r credit may be below that level which i s 
available. 
4. The precarious p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n that exists i n the 
Arab region may preclude local private investment. Banks 
may prefer investments outside the area when economic 
risks are lower and p r o f i t s are higher. 
I t should be noted that the banking sector i n Lebanon does 
contribute to the countries i n v i s i b l e exports through i t s ' internation-
a l a c t i v i t i e s . I n this way the banking sector i s related to growth 
i n the Lebanese economy. 
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A. COMPARATIVE STUDY 
Sim i l a r i t i e s and differences between the banking sectors of 
Saudi Arabia, Libya, Kuwait, and Lebanon have emerged from the 
previous chapters. I n Chapter IV, with the aid of a comparative 
table, these differences and s i m i l a r i t i e s are highliglfed and 
discussed. 
Table 16 shows that ownership of the banking sector d i f f e r s 
from country to country. In Libya the system i s nationalised 
while i n Kuwait the system i s owned privately and ent i r e l y by local 
Kuwaitians. I n Saudi Arabia and Lebanon a mixture of foreign and 
local ownership is characteristic. Nationalisation of the banlcing 
sector rests mainly on the argument that the authorities and not 
foreign private interest should be able to influence the flow of 
capital w i t h i n t h e i r own country. The argument may be thought to 
be p a r t i c u l a r l y s t r o i ^ i n the case of developing countries. 
The fact that foreign banks are allowed to operate i n some 
countries r e f l e c t s two main factors. F i r s t l y , the recognition 
that foreign banks provide additional expertise and so stimulate 
efficiency i n the banking sector. Secondly, the strong influence 
and control that Western banlcs have acquired i n many Arab States has 
not yet been replaced by local banking independence. The Kuwait 
system of private but local ownership represents the compromise 
between nationalisation and foreign ownership. 
I t i s interesting to note that the size of the Lebanese banking 
- 7 7 -
sector, as measured by t o t a l consolidated assets. Is almost t h a t 
of the other three countif^ies combined.^ This emphasises the 
importance of Lebanon as a f i n a n c i a l centre w i t h i n the Arab World. 
2 
The reasons f o r t h i s were discussed e a r l i e r i n t h i s paper. 
Furthermore, i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note t h a t Saudi Arabia, by f a r 
the l a r g e s t r e c i p i e n t of o i l revenues of the three o i l States, has 
a commercial banking system smaller than t h a t of e i t h e r Kuwait or 
Libya. This may be explained by a number of f a c t o r s . 
1. The p o l i c y of the a u t h o r i t i e s to d i s t r i b u t e o i l wealth 
amongst the people i n the country. Income must be 
acquired before i t can be deposited. I n Saudi Arabia 
b e n e f i t s from o i l revenues have not perculated through 
the economy v i a government expenditure to the extent t h a t 
has taken place i n Kuwait. 
2. The f a c t t h a t estimates put the population i n Saudi 
Arabia as 7 m i l l i o n . I n Kuwait there are under 1 
m i l l i o n people and i n Libya there are under 2 m i l l i o n 
3 
people. Thus one would not expect per c a p i t a l income 
to be so high and correspondingly deposits w i l l not be so 
l a r g e . 
I t i s also s u r p r i s i n g , given t h a t Libya has over the l a s t few 
years been r e c e i v i n g o i l revenues of a greater magnitude than Kuwait, 
1. Annual Central Bank reports of Kuwait, Libya, and Lebanon, 
(1971), and Saudi Arabian Monetary A u t h o r i t y Annual r e p o r t . ( l 9 7 l ) . 
2. See Chapter I I I , P. 68 to 69. 
3. Arab-Turkish Chambers of Commerce, Economic Facts and Figures, 
(September, 1973). 
- 7 8 -
TABLE 1 6 
COMPARATIVE INTER-COUNTRY TABLE ( 1 9 7 1 ) 
Countries Kuwait 
r 
Saudi 
Arabia 
t 
Libya Lebanon 
I n d i c a t o r s 
Ovmership ( A l l Local) P r i v a t e 
(Mixed, Local 
6e Foreign) 
Private 
Nationalised (Mixed, Local 
6e Foreign) 
Private 
T o t a l Assets 
i n $ ( M i l l i o n ) 
1 , 6 0 0 5 0 0 8 0 0 2 , 5 0 0 
Foreign Assets 
as a 7o of 
t o t a l assets 
7 1 2 4 3 5 6 
Foreign 
Assets/Local 
c r e d i t r a t i o 
Local c r e d i t 
was 347o of 
f o r e i g n 
assets 
Foreign 
assets was 
29% of 
l o c a l c r e d i t 
Foreign 
assets was 
7% of 
l o c a l c r e d i t 
Local c r e d i t 
was 27% of 
f o r e i g n 
assets 
Trading 
Cr e d i t as 
a % of t o t a l 
l o c a l c r e d i t 
7 0 4 0 3 8 5 3 
P r i n c i p l e 
source of 
funds 
Local Local Local Outside 
Lebanon 
P r i n c i p l e 
use of 
funds 
Outside 
Kuwait 
W i t h i n 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Within 
Libya 
Outside 
Lebanon 
Lending 
r a t e s X 
5 r . 6 3 - 4 4 3 - 4 
Borrowing 
r a t e s % 
6 - 8 7 6 
DATA SOURCE; Annual Central Bank Reports of Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia, Libya and Lebanon. 
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t h a t i t s ' banking sector i s only h a l f the s i z e . Apart from the 
two reasons mentioned above perhaps the f a c t t h a t the system i s 
n a t i o n a l i s e d provides a p a r t i a l explanation f o r t h i s . A shortage 
of l o c a l management s k i l l may r e s u l t i n i n e f f i c i e n c y of operations. 
Thus costs become higher and the returns t o investors may be lower. 
N a t i o n a l i s a t i o n furthermore may reduce e f f e c t i v e competition i n the 
banking sector and t h i s may i t s e l f b r i n g about i n e f f i c i e n t banking 
operations. Of course n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n need not necessarily imply 
i n e f f i c i e n c y i n operations. I t w i l l depend on how the sector i s 
organised. 
Item three of the t a b l e shows the percentage of f o r e i g n assets 
to t o t a l assets of each of the four banking sectors. The f i g u r e 
i n d i c a t e s how e x p a t r i a t e i n nature each of the banking s t r u c t u r e s 
are. The Kuwaiti and Lebanese systems appear to be h i g h l y f o r e i g n 
o r i e n t a t e d while the Saudi Arabian and Libyan banking sectors appear 
to be engaged p r i m a r i l y i n l o c a l finance. These c o n t r a s t i n g f i g u r e s 
r e f l e c t two main f a c t o r s . 
1 . The absorptive capacity f o r c a p i t a l w i t h i n each country. 
The o p p o r t u n i t y f o r l o c a l investment i n Saudi Arabia, 
by v i r t u e of i t s ' very s i z e , i s greater than i n e i t h e r of 
the other c o u n t r i e s . However, t h i s i s not always t r u e . 
The p o t e n t i a l f o r a g r i c u l t u r e development i n Saudi Arabia 
r e l a t i v e to i t s ' s i z e , f o r example, i s smaller than t h a t i n 
the Lebanon. 
2 . Depending on who owns the banking system the behaviour of 
- 8 0 ^ 
t h a t system w i l l be d i f f e r e n t . I n Libya, where the 
system i s n a t i o n a l i s e d and the a u t h o r i t i e s have d i r e c t 
c o n t r o l on c r e d i t a l l o c a t i o n s , very l i t t l e c a p i t a l flows 
outside the country. I n Lebanon, where f o r e i g n banks 
are predominant, the bulk of banking c r e d i t i s channelled 
outside the country. 
Item four of the table shows the amount of c r e d i t from the 
banking sector which i s being channelled l o c a l l y i n r e l a t i o n to 
t o t a l f o r e i g n holdings. Item four d i f f e r e s from item three i n t h a t 
i t excludes such other assets holdings as inter-bank deposits. 
These represent the counterpart, i n the Libyan n a t i o n a l i s e d system, 
of the f o r e i g n deposit holdings made by the p r i v a t e banks i n the 
other three banking systems. That i s , the excess l i q u i d i t y p o s i t i o n 
i s shown i n t e r n a l l y i n Libya w h i l e i n Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the 
Lebanon i t i s met l a r g e l y by f o r e i g n deposit assets. 
From these f i g u r e s and i n the absence of Central Bank d i r e c t i v e s , 
one can deduce th a t Saudi Arabian banks have found i t p r o f i t a b l e to 
use t h e i r funds l o c a l l y w h i l e i n Kuwait and Lebanon banks have 
p r e f e r r e d overseas investments. As the Libyan system i s n a t i o n a l i s e d 
i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o say whether the high r a t i o of l o c a l t o f o r e i g n 
finance i s a r e s u l t of c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y d i r e c t i v e s or management 
preferences. I n the l i g h t of the other f i g u r e i t would seem t h a t 
the a u t h o r i t i e s have been instrumental i n f o r m i i ^ commercial banking 
p o l i c y . I f the Libyan system was to move i n t o p r i v a t e hands one 
would expect t h e i r holdings of f o r e i g n assets t o r i s e considerably. 
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Item 5 of the comparative t a b l e shows t r a d i n g c r e d i t as a 
percentage of t o t a l l o c a l c r e d i t . Trading c r e d i t i s defined as 
the c r e d i t advanced by the commercial banks, f o r the im p o r t a t i o n 
and d i s t r i b u t i o n of mainly consumer durable and luxury goods. 
As t r a d i n g c r e d i t i s not d i r e c t l y l i n k e d t o sustained economic 
growth, t h i s f i g u r e gives us some idea of the d i r e c t c o n t r i b u t i o n 
banks are making to economic development i n each of the f o u r 
c o u n t r i e s . 
I t appears t h a t i n a l l f o u r countries the banking sectors 
advance r e l a t i v e l y large amounts of c r e d i t t o the tra d i n g sector. 
1 
Kuwaiti banks a l l o c a t e 70 per cent of l o c a l c r e d i t to t h i s sector. 
The Saudi Arabian and Libyan systems advance nearly 40 per cent of 
2 
l o c a l c r e d i t to the t r a d i n g sector. The r e l a t i v e l y high f i g u r e 
f o r Kuwait r e f l e c t s the f a c t t h a t Kuwait, w h i l e having a very small 
i n d u s t r i a l sector, has one of the highest per-capita income i n the 
world. Kuwaitians have, as have the Lebanese, acquired very 
Westernised tastes and preferences. This can only be met by the 
i m p o r t a t i o n of Western goods. The f i g u r e f o r Libya suggests t h a t 
n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of the banking sector has not been wholly 
successful i n a s s u r i r ^ a major r o l e f o r the banks i n l o c a l economic 
development. 
Items 6 and 7 show the main sources and uses made of banking 
sector funds i n each of the four countries. Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , 
l o c a l deposits form the main source of funds i n the o i l r i c h s t a t e s . 
1. Annual Central Bank Report of Kuwait. (1973). 
2, Annual Central Bank Report of Libya. (1971), and Saudi Arabian 
Monetary A u t h o r i t y Annual Report. (1971). 
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The Lebanese banking sector acquires most of i t s ' funds from 
abroad f o r reasons already mentioned.^ Although relevant data i s 
not a v a i l a b l e i t i s believed t h a t the funds come from both Western 
depositors and depositors from the wealthy Arab States. Commercial 
banks i n both Kuwait and Lebanon u t i l i s e most of t h e i r c a p i t a l 
abroad. C o n t r a s t i n g l y commercial banks i n Saudi Arabia and Libya 
use the bulk of t h e i r funds f o r l o c a l purposes. The reasons f o r 
2 
t h i s have already been discussed. 
Lendir^ and borrowing terms of the four banking sectors i n 
question share many common c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . None of the banking 
sectors provide long term c r e d i t f a c i l i t i e s . Advances are mainly 
f o r w o r k i i ^ and not investment c a p i t a l . Credit i s normally 
advanced f o r periods of s i x months t o one year. Although i n many 
instances c r e d i t i s continuously advanced and so i n e f f e c t i s given 
f o r longer periods of time. 
I n t e r e s t paid on savings on time deposits tends towards the 
3 4 4 per cent l e v e l . Bank lending rates tend towards 7 per cent. 
Rates do vary s l i g h t l y between countries and between p a r t i c u l a r 
types of accounts, but the average tends t o approximate the f i g u r e s 
o u t l i n e d above. One may be surprised t h a t rates i n what are sur-
plus c o u n t r i e s are as high as t h i s . However, when compared to 
Western rates of i n t e r e s t they appear r e l a t i v e l y low. Of course 
f o r e i g n currency deposit rates are s i m i l a r to those paid abroad 
and so are c u r r e n t l y higher. 
1. See Chapter I I I , P. 68 to 69. 
2. See P. 79 to 80^ 
3. Annual Central Bank Reports of Kuwait. Libya, and Lebanon, 
(1971). and Saudi Arabian Monetary A u t h o r i t y Annual Report. (1971). 
4. I.B.I.D. 
- 8 3 -
B. SOME SHORTCOMINGS OF COMMERCIAL BANKING IN ARAB STATES 
Examination of conmercial banking systems i n Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Libya, and Lebanon has shown t h a t r a p i d expansion i n bank-
ing a c t i v i t y has occured over the l a s t few years. However, the 
nature of t h i s expansion has meant t h a t commercial banking have 
f a i l e d to play a more dynamic and a c t i v e r o l e i n l o c a l and regional 
economic development. A number of explanatory f a c t o r s can be 
i d e n t i f i e d . 
1. A c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of Arab commercial banking i s the un-
balance which p r e v a i l s i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of loans and 
advances as between various economic sectors. Credit 
i s advanced mainly f o r the i m p o r t a t i o n and d i s t r i b u t i o n 
of goods. This was evident i n Kuwait where the banking 
sector i s i n p r i v a t e hands, and i n Libya where the system 
i s n a t i o n a l i s e d . This bias i n favour of l a r g e l y non^ ? 
productive sectors cannot be i n the best i n t e r e s t s of 
l o c a l economic development. I t seems t h i s p a t t e r n of 
c r e d i t d i s t r i b u t i o n has not a l t e r e d r a d i c a l l y over the 
l a s t few years. 
2, Another c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of Arab commercial banks i s the 
nature of c r e d i t f a c i l i t i e s provided. They are mostly 
and overwhelmingly i n the form of short rather than 
medium and long term c r e d i t , though there are some s l i g h t 
d i f f e r e n c e s as between d i f f e r e n t countries. Loans are 
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u s u a l l y made f o r periods ranging between s i x months 
to a year. Short term c r e d i t i s obviously most use-
f u l f o r short term p r o f i t making p r o j e c t s such as 
import f i n a n c i n g . I t i s not designed to supply i n v e s t -
ment c a p i t a l f o r i n d u s t r i a l or a g r i c u l t u r a l expansion 
and development. This feature i s of course t r u e of 
many commercial banking systems i n developed countries. 
However, i n the more developed countries other 
i n s t i t u t i o n s e x i s t to augment c a p i t a l supplies to 
a g r i c u l t u r a l and i n d u s t r i a l sectors. I n the Arab States 
the f i n a n c i a l s u p e r s t r u c t u r e i s not so broadly based. 
The banks may t h e r e f o r e have to perform somewhat d i f f e r e n t 
f u n c t i o n than t h e i r counterparts i n more developed 
co u n t r i e s . 
3. T h i r d l y the banking s t r u c t u r e i n some Arab countries i s 
fragmented, i n t h a t too many banks are allowed to operate. 
This f e a t u r e i s most rele v a n t i n Lebanon where over 70 
banks are operating. Fragmentation has c e r t a i n adverse 
consequences. I t makes medium and small sized banks 
vulnerable, w i t h the r e s u l t t h a t funds tend to be d i v e r t e d 
away from them e.g. the I n t r a crash i n October, 1966. I t 
may i n t e r f e r e w i t h e f f i c i e n c y and render the cost of c r e d i t 
higher than i t might otherwise be. Also i t makes the 
costs of automation much higher f o r the smaller bank. 
However, some degree of competition i n the p r o v i s i o n of 
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banking services may not be necessarily bad. V/here 
competition precludes monopoly power p o s i t i v e gains 
may be obtained e.g. the cost of services may be lower 
than migjit otherwise have been. 
4. The f a c t t h a t f o r e i g n banks play such an important part 
i n Arab commercial banking may r e s u l t i n c e r t a i n d i s -
advantages. The use and d i s p o s i t i o n of l o c a l funds 
might becdetermined by f o r e i g n headquarters rather than 
by l o c a l management. Therefore funds may not be used 
i n ways conclusive to domestic and regional economic 
development. This is c e r t a i n l y a f a c t o r determining 
the nature of Lebanese and t o a less extent Saudi 
Arabian commercial banking a c t i v i t y . However, the owner-
ship argument does not i t s e l f e x p l a i n the degree of 
involvement of commercial banks i n regional economic 
development. F i r s t l y , i n Kuwait, where a l l banks are 
iCuwaiti owned, l o c a l management play only a minor r o l e i n 
f i n a n c i n g domestic development. Secondly, the Libyan 
banking sector, which i s n a t i o n a l i s e d , has yet to play 
an a c t i v e r o l e i n f i n a n c i i ^ l o c a l economic development. 
5. Given the l i m i t e d absorptive capacity f o r c a p i t a l i n the 
Arab region i t i s i n e v i t a b l e t h a t commercial banks i n the 
area w i l l look towards the i n t e r n a t i o n a l market. Invest-
ments which o f f e r low r i s k and high r e t u r n should be sought 
a f t e r . However, i t i s a feature of banks i n the region 
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t h a t they hold the bulk of t h e i r f o r e i g n assets as 
deposits w i t h f o r e i g n banks. As a r e s u l t of recent 
events i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l money market, s u b s t a n t i a l 
losses have been i n c u r r e d . Kuwait and Saudi Arabian 
banks i n p a r t i c u l a r l o s t h e a v i l y . I t i s of i n t e r e s t 
t o the banks to guard against f u r t h e r losses. This 
could take the form of f i x e d investment assets abroad. 
D i r e c t investments and equity purchases are l i k e l y to 
appreciate i n value over time. Perhaps an index l i n k e d 
deposit scheme could be operated.^ This i s being 
s e r i o u s l y discussed by o f f i c i a l s i n Kuwait at t h i s time. 
At the same time, and as a r e s u l t of increasing un-
c e r t a i n t i e s abroad, the banks may look closer a t l o c a l 
investment o p p o r t u n i t i e s . 
1. For a comprehensive explanation, see Mabro R.E., 
Hie Absorptive Capacity of the Arab World and 
Investment p o l i c y . (Seminar en Investment 
P o l i c i e s of Arab O i l Producing Countries, Kuwait, 
February, 1971). 
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C. COMMERCIAL BANKING AND FUTURE INVOLVEMENT IN LOCAL/ 
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
Before the banking sector i n the Arab world can take a more 
a c t i v e r o l e than i t has to date i n f i n a n c i n g Arab economic develop-
ment a number of p r e - r e q u i s i t s must be met. 
1. A strengthening and widening of the i n s t i t u t i o n a l base 
i s of primary importance. New i n s t i t u t i o n s would take 
the form of merchant and investment banks, f i n a n c i a l 
companies, and other f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s . This 
would make a v a i l a b l e medium and long term loans on a more 
s u b s t a n t i a l s c a l e . Some of the e x i s t i n g commercial banks 
could become more s p e c i a l i s e d i n the manner suggested 
above. I n d i v i d u a l banks may be given c e r t a i n sectors 
of the economy to finance. Where specialised i n s t i t u t i o n s 
are i n i t i a t e d the commercial banks should become d i r e c t l y 
involved i n t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s by depositing funds w i t h them. 
Advantages of such s p e c i a l i s a t i o n would be many f o l d . 
Notably large scale finance could be made a v a i l a b l e f o r 
sectors p r e v i o u s l y l i m i t e d t o small amounts of c a p i t a l . 
Also thorough p r o j e c t a p p r a i s a l could be c a r r i e d out and 
so economically v i a b l e p r o j e c t s determined. 
2» The development of an a c t i v e c a p i t a l market i s important. 
Of a l l the f a m i l i a r b e n e f i t s t h a t are bound to accrue 
from the development of a c a p i t a l market one i s p a r t i c - t 
u l a r l y r e l e v a n t i n connection w i t h the p o t e n t i a l r o l e of 
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Arab banking i n the development of the Arab region. 
The c a p i t a l market would provide a v e h i c l e f o r con-
v e r t i n g short term funds i n t o medium and long term 
c a p i t a l f o r investment purposes. The p o s s i b i l i t y 
of f l o a t i n g long term s e c u r i t i e s i n an a c t i v e prim-
ary c a p i t a l market provides the issuees w i t h a con-
venient opening f o r r a i s i n g long term investment 
c a p i t a l . The existence of an a c t i v e secondary market 
f o r such s e c u r i t i e s would ensure t h a t investors assets 
are f a i r l y l i q u i d i n nature. Commercial banks, as 
w e l l as other f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , could become 
important i n v e s t o r s i n the stock exchange. At present, 
however, banking r e g u l a t i o n s i n Lebanon and Saudi Arabia 
prevent commercial banks from i n v e s t i n g d i r e c t l y i n 
the i n d u s t r i a l , a g r i c u l t u r a l , or commercial sectors. 
Banking r e g u l a t i o n s i n Kuwait and Libya d i f f e r from the 
above i n t h a t they are allowed to make outside i n v e s t -
ments. 
3. The prospect of a c t i v e involvement by the banking sector 
i n r e g i o n a l development w i l l depend p a r t i a l l y on the 
implementation and f u r t h e r reinforcement of Arab i n v e s t -
ment insurance schemes.^ 
4. Another p r e - r e q u i s i t e f o r improvirg and developing Arab 
f i n a n c i a l systems l i e s i n greater co-operation between 
1. See Chapter I I , P.39 to45, 
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Arab banks. Co-operation at present i s r e s t r i c t e d 
l a r g e l y to t r a n s f e r s , c o l l e c t i o n of b i l l s , and other 
r e l a t e d operations. The pooling of resources would 
f o r instance enable than to undertake large scale 
banking operations. Some j o i n t banking ventures 
have taken place, between European and Arab banks. 
However, they have been a t the i n i t i a t i v e of f o r e i g n 
banks and ventures were i n the consumer rather than 
producer market. I f the p o t e n t i a l l y large pool of 
funds made a v a i l a b l e by j o i n t ventures i s to help 
finance the process of economic development, these 
funds should be u t i l i s e d i n the productive and vast 
consumer markets. 
5. The movement of commercial banking away from f o r e i g n 
to l o c a l ownership may help to induce the system to 
increase i t s ' holding o f l o c a l assets and decrease i t s ' 
h o l ding of f o r e i g n assets. However, a f t e r comparing 
those l o c a l l y owned systems w i t h those mixed ownership 
systems the argument appears to have l i t t l e substance.^ 
Regardless of whether f o r e i g n or l o c a l l y owned, 
commercial banks operate i n such a way as to maximise 
r e t u r n s . With l i m i t e d low r i s k and high r e t u r n 
investment o p p o r t u n i t i e s a t home, banks w i l l n a t u r a l l y 
look abroad. 
1. See P.85, 
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A l l countries of the region have adopted plans f o r develop-
ment based on i n d u s t r i a l and/or a g r i c u l t u r a l growth. Sub-
sequently, a number of s p e c i a l i s e d i n s t i t u t i o n s have been 
established over the l a s t decade to provide c a p i t a l and r e l a t e d 
services t o p a r t i c u l a r sectors. Specialised i n s t i t u t i o n s serve 
l a r g e l y the i n t e r n a l c a p i t a l needs of each country, and have as 
an o b j e c t i v e the promotion of i n t e r - c o u n t r y f i n a n c i a l flows. 
I n t h i s Chapter a b r i e f survey of some specialised i n s t i t u t i o n s 
i n Saudi Arabia, Libya, Kuwait, and Lebanon i s made. 
Also some suggestions are made as to how they may change i n 
the f u t u r e t o best promote l o c a l economic development, 
A. SAUDI ARABIA 
A g r i c u l t u r a l Bank 
The A g r i c u l t u r a l Bank i n Saudi Arabia was i n i t i a t e d by the 
government i n 1964 and c u r r e n t l y has f i v e branches w i t h i n the 
country. I t was set up w i t h the aim of providing short, medium, 
and long term c r e d i t f o r the a g r i c u l t u r a l sector. Finan c i a l 
support f o r t h i s sector i s of p a r t i c u l a r importance i n Saudi 
Arabia where 75 per cent of the population i s engaged i n 
a g r i c u l t u r e , ^ 
Stated o b j e c t i v e s of the bank are: 
1. Arab-Turkish Chamber of Commerce, Economic Facts and 
Figures (September, 1973, P.36). 
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1. To ensure the consumer a good q u a l i t y of a g r i c u l t u r e 
and animal produce a t the cheapest p r i c e possible. 
2. To attempt to narrow the gap between consumption and 
l o c a l production. 
The banks c a p i t a l has increased by over 400 per cent since 
i t s ' i n s e p t i o n . I t was increased from 10 m i l l i o n r i y a l s i n the 
f i s c a l year 1964 to 1965, to 16 m i l l i o n r i y a l s i n 1965 to 1966 
and then t o 24 m i l l i o n r i y a l s i n 1966 to 1967. This f i g u r e 
reached 37 m i l l i o n r i y a l s i n 1968 t o 1969 and by 1970 i t had 
reached 53 m i l l i o n r i y a l s . 
The r e l a t i v e percentage of outstanding loans to c a p i t a l i n -
creased from 38 per cent to 70 per cent over the 1964 to 1969 
p e r i o d . This r e f l e c t s the increase i n loan a c t i v i t y by the bank 
since i t s ' i n i t i a t i o n . 
Medium term loans t y p i c a l l y have comprised of the major part 
of the banks a c t i v i t y . I n 1966 medium term loans accounted f o r 
91 per cent of a l l loans, i n 1970 the f i g u r e was over 80 per cent. 
The number and type of loans granted by the bank since i t began 
operations u n t i l 1970 are tabulated i n Table 17. 
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TABLE 17 
Kind of loans Number of Loans 
Value 
( R i y a l s ) 
Short term 3,537 4,726,875 
Medium term 9,562 47,649,643 
Long term 3 109,700 
13,102 52,486,218 
SOURCE; Saudi Arabian Monetary A u t h o r i t y Annual 
Report, 1970, 
C l a s s i f i c a t i o n of loans by purpose shows t h a t 54.2 per cent 
of nffidium term loans were f o r the purchase of engines, pun^>s, and 
pipes, 13.2 per cent f o r l i v e s t o c k , p o u l t r y and fodder, 9.5 per 
cent f o r the purchases of t r u c k s , t r a c t o r s , and spare p a r t s , and 
the remainder f o r other purposes. Short term loans were us u a l l y 
granted t o farmers t o enable them t o meet sundry expenditures 
i n c l u d i n g wages of seasonal labour, purchase of f u e l , seed and 
f e r t i l i z e r . Long term loans are avoided by the bank because they 
are viewed as too r i s k y . 
The operations of the bank have undoubtably helped finance the 
growth of the a g r i c u l t u r a l sector. The bank has made more c a p i t a l 
a v a i l a b l e f o r a g r i c u l t u r e over the period of i t s ' operation than 
would otherwise have been. However, i n r e l a t i o n to p o t e n t i a l 
demand f o r c a p i t a l , the banks f i n a n c i a l base remains rather small.^ 
1. See United Nations Economic and Social O f f i c e i n Beixrut, 
Financing of I n d u s t r i a l Development of the Middle East, 
(No. ESOB/PD/72/18 Rev.l, P.60 to 61). 
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B. KUWAIT 
Savings and Credit Bank 
The Savir^s and Credit Bank i n Kuwait was i n i t i a t e d i n 1957 
and i s a government agency. I t s ' c a p i t a l 120 K.D. m i l l i o n i s 
e n t i r e l y paid up by the a u t h o r i t i e s . The main o b j e c t i v e of the 
bank i s to grant loans f o r real estate, i n d u s t r y , and a g r i c u l t u r a l 
p r o j e c t s . The Bank i s guided p r i m a r i l y by s o c i a l o b j e c t i v e s and 
only secondarily by ordinary banking p r i n c i p l e s , i . e . the p r o f i t 
motive. 
The maximum period of loans i s 10 years, extended f o r 
e s t a b l i s h i n g and expanding i n d u s t r i a l p r o j e c t s or f o r b u i l d i n g 
housing f a c i l i t i e s f o r the workers of i n d u s t r y . Credit i s normally 
granted i n c o - o r d i n a t i o n w i t h i n d u s t r i a l plans and w i t h the co-
o p e r a t i o n of the I n d u s t r i a l Development Committee, Once the 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y of the p r o j e c t i s ascertained decisions t o extend loans 
are made. I t i s p o l i c y t h a t any one loan should not exceed 30 per 
cent of t o t a l value of the p r o j e c t . 
Total l o a n s granted by the bank amounted to K.D. 38 m i l l i o n 
d u r i n g 1972 to 1973. On average 80 per cent of i t s ' lending 
a c t i v i t i e s were confined mainly t o medium-term loans f o r construct-
i o n of houses. This i s a r e f l e c t i o n of the demand f o r property 
i n Kuwait where surplus funds are i n c r e a s i n g l y being channelled 
i n t o r e a l estate. The f a c t t h a t i n d u s t r y received r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e 
c r e d i t r e f l e c t s two main f a c t o r s . 
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1, The high r i s k e n t a i l e d i n long term i n d u s t r i a l loans, 
2, The lack of v i a b l e i n d u s t r i a l p r o j e c t s . 
The Saving and Credit Bank of Kuwait, one must conclude, 
has not made a s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n to i n d u s t r i a l development 
w i t h i n the Kuwait economy. Table 18 gives an i n d i c a t i o n of the 
r e l a t i v e importance of commercial banks to sp e c i a l i s e d i n s t i t u t i o n s 
i n Kuwait i n terms of i n d u s t r i a l c r e d i t s . Specialised i n s t i t u t i o n s 
provide r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e i n d u s t r i a l c r e d i t and t h e i r importance 
appears t o be f a l l i n g . I n 1970 specialised i n s t i t u t i o n s i n Kuwait 
provided 8.8 per cent of t o t a l commercial banking i n d u s t r i a l c r e d i t . 
By 1971 t h i s f i g u r e had f a l l e n t o 6.2 per cent. 
TABLE 18 
' (K.D. M i l l i o n s ) 1966 1967 1968 
? ( r 
1969 1970 1971 
1. T o t a l I n d u s t r i a l 
C r edits of the 
Banking System 
- 17.1 22.7 
2, Tota l I n d u s t r i a l 
Credits of the 
Specialised 
I n s t i t u t i o n s 
1.5 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4 
Percentage of 2/1 - - 8.8 6.2 
SOURCE; United Nations Economic and Social O f f i c e i n 
Be i r u t based on data compiled from nati o n a l sources. 
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C. LIBYA 
National A g r i c u l t u r a l Bank 
The National A g r i c u l t u r a l Bank was i n i t i a t e d by the government 
on August 18th, 1955. The main aim of the bank i s to provide long, 
medium,and short term loans f o r a g r i c u l t u r e on various s o f t loan 
c o n d i t i o n . I t s ' c a p i t a l i s e n t i r e l y paid by the a u t h o r i t i e s 
through budgetary a l l o c a t i o n s . 
The banks c a p i t a l has increased s t e a d i l y over the l a s t decade 
from L.D. 5 m i l l i o n i n 1967 t o L.D. 6.2 m i l l i o n i n 1968 and i n 1971 
i t was r a i s e d to L.D. 10 m i l l i o n . This represents a 100 per cent 
increase over the period 1967 to 1971. 
Medium and short term loans have t y p i c a l l y comprised of the 
major p a r t of the banks a c t i v i t i e s i n e a r l i e r years. I n 1966 to 
1967 short term loans c o n s t i t u t e d 42,6 per cent of t o t a l loans, 
medium c o n s t i t u t e d 30,8 per cent of t o t a l loans, and long term 
26,3 per cent. By 1971 the share was 17 per cent, 26 per cent and 
57 per cent r e s p e c t i v e l y . Thus a move away from short term and 
towards long term loans has taken place. There are two main 
f a c t o r s e x p l a i n i n g t h i s t r e n d . 
1. Recognition of the need f o r long term loans f o r 
a g r i c u l t u r e . 
2. The f a c t t h a t other i n s t i t u t i o n s , namely commercial 
banks, are mainly engaged i n supplying short term loans. 
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The i n t e r e s t payable on loans varies according to the precise 
nature of each loan. Rates are 4.5 per cent f o r short loans, 
3 per cent f o r medium term loans and 1 to 2 per cent f o r long term 
loans. Rates have, however, f l u c t u a t e d over time and i n 1966 to 
1967 rates were abolished a l t o g e t h e r i n order to encourage 
borrowing i n the a g r i c u l t u r a l sector. 
The shortage of relevant data makes i t d i f f i c u l t to assess the 
operations of the bank. However, i n terms of c a p i t a l size i f would 
appear t h a t the bank can only be making a minor impact on the 
a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r . 
I n d u s t r i a l and Real Estate Bank 
Like the A g r i c u l t u r a l Bank, the I n d u s t r i a l Bank was set up by 
the Libyan a u t h o r i t i e s and i t s ' c a p i t a l i s paid i n by the government. 
I t s ' paid i n c a p i t a l reached L.D. 22.2 m i l l i o n i n 1971. The aims 
of the bank are twofold i n nature. 
1. I t aims to extend loans to i n d u s t r y . 
2, I t aims to a l l e v i a t e the housing problem t h a t p r e v a i l s i n 
the country. 
A r t i c l e 6 of the Banks Law e x p l i c i t e l y states t h a t funds 
a l l o c a t e d f o r i n d u s t r y s h a j l not be invested i n b u i l d i n g or v i c e 
versa except by a d e c i s i o n of the Board of D i r e c t o r s of the Bank and 
according to s p e c i f i c c o n d i t i o n s . Funds of the Bank are t o be 
a l l o c a t e d evenly between the i n d u s t r i a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l sectors. 
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However, i n f a c t , r e a l estate has received the bulk of bank loans 
over the period of i t s ' operations. Over the period 1966 to 
1967, 80 per cent of i t s ' approved loans were approved f o r r e a l 
e s t a t e . By the 1970 to 1971 period t h i s f i g u r e had r i s e n to 
90.5 per cent. A number of explanatary f a c t o r s have been f o r -
warded t o e x p l a i n the one sided growth of the Bank.^ 
1. A p p l i c a t i o n f o r loans i n r e a l estate are much greater 
i n number than a p p l i c a t i o n by i n d u s t r y . 
2. The lack of sound study i n t o i n d u s t r i a l p r o j e c t s . 
Below i s a table of i n d u s t r i a l loans by sector during the 
period 1970 to 1971. 
TABLE 19 
Sectors (L.D.POO) 
I n d u s t r i a l Projects 
Based on A g r i c u l t u r a l 592.6 
Projects 
B u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l s 66.5 i n d u s t r y 
Carpentary workshops 54.6 
Other 37.4 
SOURCE; Central Bank of Libya Annual Report, 1971. 
1. Central Bank of Libya Annual Report. (1971). 
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I t i s noteworthy t h a t the bulk of i n d u s t r i a l loans go t o the 
food processing i n d u s t r y . Thus growth i n the economy based on 
a g r i c u l t u r a l i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n i s being encouraged. 
D. LEBANON 
Banque de Credit A g r i c o l e , I n d u s t r i a l et Foncier 
The Banque de Credit A g r i c o l e , I n d u s t r i a l et Foncier (B.C.A.I.F.) 
was established i n 1955 as a p a r t l y owned government i n s t i t u t i o n , 
and began operations i n 1956. I t was the second s p e c i a l i s e d bank 
to be set up i n the region, the f i r s t being the I n d u s t r i a l Bank 
of I r a q which was set up i n 1946. 
The B.C.A.I.F. extends c r e d i t s to p r o j e c t s i n a g r i c u l t u r e , 
i n d u s t r y , and r e a l estate. The Bank i s purely a c r e d i t g i v i n g 
i n s t i t u t i o n and may not p a r t i c i p a t e i n i n d u s t r i a l enterprises as 
founders and/or shareholders. This i s i n contrast to the Savings 
and C r e d i t Bank o f Kuwait which i s permitted to do so. 
Medium and short term loans are extended t o j o i n t stock com-
panies, the paid up c a p i t a l of which exceeds L.L. 500 thousand. 
Any one loan should not exceed; 
1, 25 per cent of the borrower companys' paid up c a p i t a l . 
2, 15 per cent of funds a l l o c a t e d t o i n d u s t r i a l c r e d i t . 
3, 40 per cent of the r e a l value of estates when loans are 
secured by estates. 
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4. One m i l l i o n Lebanese l i r a s , or three m i l l i o n Lebanese 
l i r a s i f guaranteed by government, i f the loan i s of 
a g r i c u l t u r a l or i n d u s t r i a l o r i g i n . 
I n t e r e s t r ates are 7.5 per cent to 9 per cent. I f a loan i s 
less than L.L. 50 thousand then a 5.5 per cent rat e is l e v i e d . 
While they represent ' s o f t term r a t e s ' they are higher than those 
rates l e v i e d by the Kuwaiti Savings and Credit Bank. This 
d i f f e r e n c e may be explained by a number of f a c t o r s . 
1. The Kuwaiti Bank i s an e n t i r e l y government owned 
i n s t i t u t i o n . Thus a stronger subsidy element i s l i k e l y 
then i n a mixed ownership i n s t i t u t i o n as the (B.C.A.I.F,) 
2. The low i n t e r e s t rates i n Kuwait r e f l e c t the f i n a n c i a l 
p o s i t i o n of the country. Lebanon i s not an o i l State. 
The acute shortage of data makes i t d i f f i c u l t to assess the 
c o n t r i b u t i o n and impact of the bank on the Lebanese economy. One 
can, however, gain some idea of the r e l a t i v e importance^of 
s p e c i a l i s e d i n s t i t u t i o n and commercial banks i n providing i n d u s t r i a l 
c r e d i t from Table 20, 
I t appears t h a t s p e c i a l i s e d i n s t i t u t i o n s only give a small 
percentage of t h a t c r e d i t given to i n d u s t r y by the banking system. 
Furthermore the share of s p e c i a l i s e d i n s t i t u t i o n s c r e d i t t o 
i n d u s t r y i s f a l l i n g . I n 1965 t h i s reached 16.5 per cent and by 
1971 t h i s f i g u r e amounted t o only 10.4 per cent. 
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TABLE 20 
(L.L. M i l l i o n s ) 
1 
1966 1967 
r 
1968 1969 1970 1971 
1. T o t a l i n d u s t r i a l 
c r e d i t of the 
b a n k i i ^ system 
293 342 382 382 370 385 
2. T o t a l i n d u s t r i a l 
c r e d i t s of the 
sp e c i a l i s e d 
i n s t i t u t i o n s 
49 51 49 44 43 40 
Percentage of 2/1 165 15 12,7 11.4 11.8 10,4 
SOURCE; United Nations Economic and Social Office i n Bei r u t 
based on data compiled from n a t i o n a l sources. 
SPECIALISED INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR FUTURE ROLE IN FINANCING 
DEVELOPMENT 
I t would appear t h a t none of the e x i s t i n g specialised 
i n s t i t u t i o n s have so f a r played a fundamentally important r o l e i n 
the process of i n d u s t r i a l o r a g r i c u l t u r a l finance. Their a c t i v i t -
i e s have been l i m i t e d by t h e i r l i m i t e d f i n a n c i a l base. For 
example i n Kuwait i n 1972 the r e l a t i v e share of various e x i s t i n g 
s p e c i a l i s e d i n s t i t u t i o n s i n f i n a n c i n g industry was only 1.3 per cent. 
The review of the various lending p o l i c i e s of the specialised 
i n s t i t u t i o n s i n d i c a t e s several l i n e s of a c t i o n and po l i c y changes 
which ought to be decided i n order to remedy some of the e x i s t i n g 
d e f i c i e n c i e s and enhance the effectiveness of these i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
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The shortage of f i n a n c i a l resources has i n c r e a s i n g l y become 
a bo t t l e n e c k i n expansion i n the a c t i v i t i e s of the various 
s p e c i a l i s e d i n s t i t u t i o n s . The i n d u s t r i a l banks do not have the 
necessary investment funds to play an important r o l e i n the 
i n d u s t r i a l development of the region. 
Important steps i n the d i r e c t i o n of strengthening the 
f i n a n c i a l resources of the s p e c i a l i s e d i n s t i t u t i o n s would be, f i r s t , 
to pay the whole of the authorised c a p i t a l and, second, t o provide 
a way f o r the p r i v a t e sector to j o i n i n financing the expansion 
of the Banks' resources. This could be done by i s s u i n g shares or 
bonds of the banks and making them a v a i l a b l e to both i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
and i n d i v i d u a l i n v e s t o r s . One weakness of the present i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
s t r u c t u r e i s t h a t the system i s not o r i g i n a l l y l i n k e d to the 
u l t i m a t e source of savings, and depends a l i t t l e too much on adhoc 
a l l o c a t i o n s from the Central Bank or the Treasury, This i s p a r t -
i c u l a r l y t r u e i n the case of the Banque de Credit Agricole, 
I n d u s t r i a l et Foncier of Lebanon, I t would be desirable there-
f o r e , to e s t a b l i s h chosen l i n k s between the d i s t r i b u t i n g mechanism 
and the normal channels of saving so t h a t the d i s t r i b u t i n g mechanism 
become i n c r e a s i n g l y capable of autonomous growth along the needs of 
the economy. 
A t t r a c t i n g p r i v a t e c a p i t a l to s p e c i a l i s e d i n s t i t u t i o n s , 
e s p e c i a l l y a newly established one, i s not l i k e l y t o be easy. The 
government w i l l have to provide appropriate incentives such as 
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guaranteed minimum dividends, or tax f r e e dividends, i n order to 
m o b i l i s e resources to such i n s t i t u t i o n s . I n c e r t a i n cases, 
government could also apply various forms of pressure on the 
e x i s t i n g f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s to buy the shares or bonds of 
s p e c i a l i s e d i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
A l l s p e c i a l i s e d i n s t i t u t i o n s place too much emphasis on 
s e c u r i t y and too l i t t l e on the p r o f i t a b i l i t y and earning p o t e n t i a l 
of the e n t e r p r i s e . I t i s worth mentioning i n t h i s context t h a t 
i n d u s t r i a l p l a n t and equipment are considered as poor s e c u r i t y 
i n most c o u n t r i e s , because i t may be d i f f i c u l t to r e a l i s e t h e i r 
value, even i n good times l e t alone bad. The problem may be more 
d i f f i c u l t i n an under-developed country than i n an advanced one, 
f o r the former the p o t e n t i a l buyers are l i k e l y to be fewer especially 
i f the i n d u s t r y concerned i s new and u n f a m i l i a r . 
A s h i f t o f concern from too much pre-occupation w i t h s e c u r i t y , 
to i n t e r e s t i n the p o t e n t i a l earning capacity of the enterprises 
w i l l n a t u r a l l y lead to a corresponding i n t e r e s t i n equity i n v e s t -
ment. I n new e n t e r p r i s e s equity p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s probably the 
most appropriate form of assistance. 
Access to managerial advice and modern techniques are some-
times more important to small and medium s i z e enterprises than 
access to f i n a n c i a l resources. Adequate research and technical 
d i v i s i o n s should be created i n the various specialised i n s t i t u t i o n s 
and wherever they e x i s t they should be strengthened. Furthermore, 
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i n d u s t r i a l banks should be more a c t i v e i n i d e n t i f y i n g f e a s i b l e 
p r o j e c t s r a t h e r than i n merely w a i t i n g f o r applicants to submit 
such p r o j e c t s . ^ This i s of p a r t i c u l a r importance i n countries 
s t i l l a t t h e i r e a r l y stage of i n d u s t r i a l development and where 
e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l t a l e n t i s r e l a t i v e l y scarce. 
1. See Chapter I I , P. 35 to 36. 
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SUMMARY AND CONaUSIONS 
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SUMMARY 
Fi n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s i n the Arab World have an important 
r o l e t o play i n the process of region a l economic and s o c i a l develop-
ment. Recent changes i n the o i l i n d u s t r y have ensured t h a t the 
reg i o n has the capacity to s e l f - f i n a n c e a l l i t s ' c a p i t a l requirements. 
From t h i s study, however, i t has become evident t h a t the various 
i n s t i t u t i o n s are a t present having only a minor impact upon develop-
ment i n the region, 
REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
The Kuwait Fund For Arab Economic Development (K.F.A.E.D.) has 
been o p e r a t i i ^ e f f e c t i v e l y and e f f i c i e n t l y over the l a s t decade 
supplying c a p i t a l t o poorer Arab States. To date i t has a l l o c a t e d 
over K.D. 100 m i l l i o n i n loans to a wide v a r i e t y o f Arab count r i e s . 
Loans have mainly been advanced f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l , communications, 
and t r a n s p o r t sectors. The Fund has provided grants f o r te c h n i c a l 
a i d . I t has also provided t e c h n i c a l guidance and expertise from 
i t s ' own s t a f f , 
A number of less t a n g i b l e achievements of the Fund, of no 
less importance, may also be i d e n t i f i e d . 
1. The K.F.A.E.D. was the i n i t i a t o r of both the Arab Fund 
For Economic and Social Development (A.F.E.S.D.) and the 
Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation (l.A.I.G.C.). 
The A.F.E.S.D. was established as a m u l t i - n a t i o n a l 
development body. I t began i t s ' operations i n 1973 and 
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has already granted three loans w i t h i n the region. The 
I.A.I.G.C. has not y e t begun i t s ' operations. The 
Corporation w i l l guarantee investments both p u b l i c and 
p r i v a t e , between Arab States, against non-economic r i s k s 
and thereby hope to s t i m u l a t e inter-Arab f i n a n c i a l flows, 
2. The Kuwait Fund, as a r e s u l t of i t s ' involvement i n the 
region, has f o s t e r e d closer s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l t i e s 
between the Arab States. 
3. The Kuwait Fund has helped i n i n t r o d u c i n g Arab countries 
to i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s such as the World Bank. 
4. The Kuwait Fund has taught Arab States to accept the 
r u l e s of the game f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l lending. 
Despite these formidable achievements, one can levy a number 
of c r i t i c i s m s a t the Fund and i d e n t i f y a number of shortcomings i n 
the way t h a t i t operates, 
1, The Funds c a p i t a l resources remain small i n r e l a t i o n to 
the needs of the region, the wealth of Kuwait, and the 
amount of funds channelled from Kuwait to other Arab 
States f o r p o l i t i c a l reasons, 
2, The Fund, as a government agency, can never be e n t i r e l y 
f r e e from p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e . 
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3. The K.F.A.E.D. has not been a c t i v e i n providing finance 
f o r i n d u s t r i a l p r o j e c t s , s o c i a l p r o j e c t s , or subscribed 
to programme a i d . 
4. Technical aid i s only a small part of Fund loans. The 
Fund, however, has made i t c l e a r t h a t the p r o v i s i o n of 
te c h n i c a l assistance to r e c e i v i n g countries may be as 
fundamentally important as f i n a n c i a l a i d . 
I t i s i n a piecemeal fashion, then, t h a t the Arab States have 
and are t a k i n g steps towards greater regional economic and so c i a l 
co-operation. The development of regional i n s t i t u t i o n s and 
schemes, as discussed i n Chapter I and I I i s s t i l l a t an infancy 
stage. 14ich scope remains f o r progress w i t h i n those i n s t i t u t i o n s 
and also f o r the development of new i n s t i t u t i o n s . P r i o r i t y should 
be given to increasing the resources a t the disposal of these 
bodies. 
COMMERCIAL BANKS 
The l a s t decade has witnessed a rapi d expansion of the banking 
system i n the Arab World. Expansion has followed the massive i n f l o w 
of o i l revenues t o the region. Growth i n the f i n a n c i a l sector i s 
a t t e s t e d by the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of l o c a l and f o r e i g n banks and t h e i r 
branches. 
Despite notable progress achieved, the r o l e that the banks have 
played i n both l o c a l and r e g i o n a l economic development has been 
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l i m i t e d . Connnunications, i n d u s t r y , and a g r i c u l t u r e have received 
n e g l i g i b l e amounts of banking c r e d i t . For example i n 1971 
i n d u s t r y received an average of only 14 per cent of l o c a l c r e d i t 
advanced by commercial banks i n Kuwait, Libya, and Lebanon, The 
f i g u r e f o r a g r i c u l t u r e was 1.7 per cent. The f i g u r e f o r c r e d i t 
going t o the import sector, however, was 52 per cent. Banks have 
thus p r e f e r r e d to focus on import f i n a n c i n g . 
The f o r e i g n holdings component of banking assets have increased 
r a p i d l y over the l a s t decade. These assets tend to be held out-
side the region i n both the American and European money markets. 
Banks have therefore not been operating i n such a way as to encourage 
the flow of funds between Arab States. 
A number of economic i m p l i c a t i o n s a r i s e from the above f i n d i n g s . 
1 . I f long terra sustained growth i s the o b j e c t i v e of a l l 
Arab States then the development of the i n d u s t r i a l , ^ 
agricultural,,and communications sectors i s important. 
Banks i n the Arab World have not been a c t i v e i n advancing 
c r e d i t t o these sectors. 
2. The p a t t e r n of loans advanced by banks between sectors 
has meant t h a t the economies of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, 
Libya, and Lebanon remain open i n nature. This i n turn 
has meant these economies have, over recent years, been 
h i t severely by the problem of imported i n f l a t i o n . 
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3. The reluctance of banks to lend money f o r l o c a l i n d u s t r i a l 
p r o j e c t s , has meant t h a t economic development along the 
l i n e of import s u b s t i t u t i o n i n d u s t r i e s has not taken 
place t o any appreciable extent. 
4 . The reluctance of banks to i n v e s t i n other Arab States 
has done l i t t l e to encourage economic co-operation w i t h i n 
the region. 
The general lack of involvement by banks i n l o c a l and regi o n a l 
development may be explained by a number of f a c t o r s . 
1 . There i s l i m i t e d absorptive capacity f o r c a p i t a l . I n 
many cases there i s a n a t u r a l c o n s t r a i n t such as l i t t l e 
or no s u i t a b l e a g r i c u l t u r a l land. The major c o n s t r a i n t , 
however, i s one of competent manpower. There e x i s t s a 
chronic shortage of technical and management s t a f f . The 
absorptive capacity of the region i s also constrained by 
p o l i t i c a l u n c e r t a i n t i e s and non-economic r i s k s t o c a p i t a l 
investment. 
2. The very nature of commercial banks i n the region pre-
cludes r a p i d involvement by them i n l o c a l and regi o n a l 
development. Only short term c r e d i t i s made a v a i l a b l e 
by the banks. Many banks are f o r e i g n owned and so l o c a l 
i n t e r e s t i s absent Also there i s l i t t l e co-operation 
between the banks. 
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The degree of f u t u r e involvement by the Arab banking sector 
i n l o c a l and r e g i o n a l development w i l l r e s t on the implementation 
of a number of changes. 
1 . The establishment of a c a p i t a l market should be encouraged. 
This would provide a v e h i c l e f o r t u r n i n g short term 
assets i n t o long term l i a b i l i t i e s . Commercial banks 
could i n v e s t i n the stock exchange and thereby involve 
themselves i n long term c a p i t a l finance. At present 
the c a p i t a l markets i n the Arab region are markedly un-
s o p h i s t i c a t e d . 
2. Commercial banks should give greater consideration to 
investment o p p o r t u n i t i e s i n i n d u s t r i a l p r o j e c t s and per-
haps lend funds on a longer term basis than at present. 
3. Banks could channel funds f o r development purposes i n -
d i r e c t l y through s p e c i a l i s e d f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s such 
as i n d u s t r i a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l banks. 
4 . The movement of banks from f o r e i g n to l o c a l hands should 
be encouraged wherever p r a c t i c a l i . e . where competent 
management i s a v a i l a b l e . This would perhaps encourage 
greater investment w i t h i n the r e g i o n by the banking 
sector. Local management i s more l i k e l y to consider 
l o c a l i n t e r e s t than f o r e i g n management. 
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5. Co-operation between banks should be encouraged. The 
pooling of f i n a n c i a l resources may allow l a r g e r p r o j e c t s 
to be financed and the r i s k s of f i n a n c i n g these p r o j e c t s 
would thus be spread. 
6. P o l i c i e s should be implemented which w i l l increase the 
regions absorptive capacity. For example measures should 
be taken t o a l l e v i a t e the shortage of s k i l l e d manpower 
i n both the sh o r t run and i n the long run, 
SPECIALISED INSTITUTIONS 
The need f o r s p e c i a l i s e d i n s t i t u t i o n s t o supply medium and 
long term c a p i t a l f o r the implementation of i n d u s t r i a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l 
growth plans, has been f e l t by a l l countries of the Arab region. 
I n s t i t u t i o n s s p e c i a l i s i n g i n i n d u s t r i a l , a g r i c u l t u r a l , and r e a l estate 
have been established i n a number of Arab States. 
These i n s t i t u t i o n s have as a r e s u l t of t h e i r operations made 
a v a i l a b l e a greater amount of c r e d i t to p a r t i c u l a r sectors than would 
otherwise have been. However, t h e i r share i n f i n a n c i r ^ development 
needs has been very small. For example, the commercial banks i n 
Kuwait and Lebanon supply a greater amount of c a p i t a l to industry 
i n t h e i r respective countries than do the i n d u s t r i a l banks i n those 
c o u n t r i e s . 
Whatever the character of the e x i s t i n g s p e c i a l i s e d i n s t i t u t i o n s 
i t i s evident t h a t none of them has so f a r acquired decisive import-
ance i n the process of economic development. There are a number of 
reasons f o r t h i s . 
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1. The shortage of f i n a n c i a l resources. The resources 
of s p e c i a l i s e d i n s t i t u t i o n s should be s u b s t a n t i a l l y 
increased. 
2. The short supply of managerial advice and modem 
techniques. Steps should be taken to ensure t h a t 
adequate t e c h n i c a l assistance i s a v a i l a b l e where necessary. 
3. The f a c t t h a t s p e c i a l i s e d i n s t i t u t i o n s place too much 
emphasis on s e c u r i t y and too l i t t l e on the p r o f i t a b i l i t y 
and earning p o t e n t i a l of p r o j e c t s . A s h i f t away from 
the pre-occupation f o r s e c u r i t y would be des i r a b l e . 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The existence of a c e r t a i n volume of c a p i t a l w i t h i n the Arab 
r e g i o n does not by i t s e l f ensure economic development. There i s 
a p r e - r e q u i s i t e need f o r a broad f i n a n c i a l base capable of not 
only m o b i l i s i n g funds, but a l l o c a t i n g funds according to p a r t i c u l a r 
needs of each country and the needs of the region as a whole. The 
development of the r e a l sector i s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d to development of 
the f i n a n c i a l sector. I n the Arab World i t i s the slowness of the 
f i n a n c i a l sector to adapt and change i n accordance w i t h the needs of 
the region t h a t has r e s t r i c t e d a f a s t e r r a t e of growth i n the r e a l 
s ector. 
While the a v a i l a b i l i t y and proper channelling of f i n a n c i a l 
resources are e s s e n t i a l f o r meeting i n d u s t r i a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l 
investment requirements i n the region, other n o n - f i n a n c i a l con-
s t r a i n t s are also of primary importance. 
1. The smallness of the p o t e n t i a l market facing a number 
of Arab States such as Kuwait and Libya precludes i n v e s t -
ment i n large i n d u s t r i a l p r o j e c t s . As a r e s u l t of trade 
b a r r i e r s a f f e c t i n g the f r e e flow of trade between Arab 
States the market f o r any one country i n the short run 
w i l l coma mainly from l o c a l demand. Local domestic 
markets, however, w i l l not allow goods to be produced on 
an economically large enough scale. The pr i c e of Western 
goods would nearly always be lower a t a l l possible l e v e l s 
of output. For the l a r g e r Arab States such as Saudi 
Arabia t h e problem i s not so acute. 
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2. The shortage of managerial and technic a l s k i l l s i n the 
region has put l i m i t a t i o n s on the amount of c a p i t a l 
t h a t can be e f f i c i e n t l y u t i l i s e d . Discussions with 
o f f i c i a l s i n The Kuwait Fund For Arab Economic Development 
and i n a number of commercial banks i n Kuwait showed the 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and te c h n i c a l gap to be a fundamental 
b a r r i e r to f u r t h e r investment both w i t h i n and between 
Arab States. One reason forwarded by the Kuwait Fund 
f o r i t s ' reliKtance to finance a greater number of pro-
j e c t s was the lack of sound p r o j e c t proposals and the 
shortage of t r a i n e d s t a f f to service these p r o j e c t s . 
Commercial bank o f f i c i a l s i n Kuwait intimated t h a t the 
added r i s k of investment i n p r o j e c t s where competent 
managenfint was not apparent has precluded such investment. 
The standard of investment p r o j e c t s submitted f o r finance 
to the banks was also said to be of a low standard. 
3. The absence of a favourable investment climate i n general 
w i t h i n the region has acted as the main b a r r i e r t o the 
f r e e f l o w of funds between Arab States. The unstable 
natxire of a number of governments has l e f t investors with 
l i t t l e confidence i n f e l l o w Arab countries to manage 
t h e i r economies. The f e a r of investors i s t h a t they may 
face the p o l i t i c a l r i s k s of e x p r o p r i a t i o n , n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n , 
and s t r i r g e n t exchange c o n t r o l b l o c k i n g the recovery of 
p r o f i t s . Accordingly investors have preferred t o invest 
outside the region where the p o l i t i c a l r i s k are not so highi 
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U n t i l these n o n - f i n a n c i a l b a r r i e r s t o economic growth are 
lowered the f i n a n c i a l system i n the Arab World i s u n l i k e l y to 
change r a p i d l y i n such a way as to play a major r o l e i n the process 
of l o c a l and r e g i o n a l development. The two are complementary 
f a c t o r s . 
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